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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Political thinkers have long worried that freedom might be self-
undermining, tending to erode the liberal rights and democratic 
politics that form its foundations.1 The argument has ancient and 
modern versions, versions of the political left and of the right.2 No 
 
 1. Throughout this article, I use “liberal” to refer to a commitment to autonomy-
protecting personal rights as a basic normative principle of political and legal order. I use 
“democratic” to refer to a commitment both to majoritarian government through elections 
and, more broadly, the idea that the collective self-government of political communities is a 
basic normative principle of political and legal order. 
 2. Anxious liberals like John Stuart Mill and meliorist conservatives like Alexis de 
Tocqueville worried that democracy threatened to swamp freedom under the “tyranny of the 
majority” or “democratic despotism.” See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 690–95 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1850) 
(describing a despotism of innumerable small forms of interference with personal liberty); id. at 
246–61 (describing “the tyranny of the majority,” a more direct application of power by a 
regnant majority over a vulnerable minority); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71–74 
(Geraint Williams ed., Everyman 1993) (1859) (describing evolution of the idea of the tyranny 
of the majority from the simple version of electoral domination to the more complex idea of 
the subtle limitation on the freedom and judgment of each by the opinions as well as the 
political power of all). These grim warnings carried very old political arguments into the 
democratic era. Thinkers as eminent and diverse as Plato and the English monarchist Robert 
Filmer (John Locke’s target in the Two Treatises on Government) have argued that a society 
dedicated to personal freedom and collective self-government would degenerate into personal 
self-indulgence and political mob rule. See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 2 (Johann P. Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680) (identifying 
the wish for self-government with original sin); id. at 28–29 (summarizing a long history of 
attacks on the character of democracies as violent, unstable, and tending to elevate selfish and 
sadistic leaders over nobler characters); 7 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 240–43 (Allan Bloom ed. & 
trans., 1991) (examining the argument that unbalanced devotion to personal freedom and 
relativism among desires and opinions undermine liberty and self-government, so that “[t]oo 
much freedom seems to change into nothing but too much slavery, both for private man and 
city” and “tyranny is probably established out of no other regime than democracy . . . the 
greatest and most savage slavery out of the extreme of freedom”). After the liberal and 
democratic revolutions in France, the United States, and elsewhere, radicals on both the left 
and the right took up the same arguments. Arch-reactionary Joseph de Maistre proclaimed that 
the French Revolution’s defiance of established authority would bring anarchy and drown 
Europe in seas of blood. For an introduction to de Maistre’s thought, see ISAIAH BERLIN, THE 
CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 91–174 (Henry 
Hardy ed., 1990). See id. at 111, 117, and 163 for particularly vivid examples of de Maistre’s 
worldview, in which human existence is soaked in blood and all violence and suffering are 
punishment for the sin of an inherently debased human nature. The leftists of the Frankfort 
School argued that the liberal doctrine of personal autonomy found its perfection in the cruel 
nihilism of the Marquis de Sade and Friedrich Nietzsche. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR 
W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 81–119 (John Cumming trans., Herder & 
Herder 1972) (1947). The twentieth century produced a new genre of anxious liberal. 
European fascism and post-colonial nationalism both suggested that free men and women 
would flock to doctrines that made them unfree: promises of ethnic unity, moral clarity, and 
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doubt the only adequate answer is the sum of the answers to many 
particular questions: whether and when popular elections undermine 
liberal rights, how free markets enhance or undermine democracy, 
and so forth. In this article, I address an emerging problem in a 
central area of contemporary freedom: reproductive autonomy. I ask 
whether reproductive autonomy can undermine the political 
conditions that sustain it: a political and legal culture committed to 
individual rights and the stability of the political order across 
generations. The possibility that reproductive freedom might be self-
undermining arises from two demographic crises. In Europe and 
Northeast Asia, fertility rates—the number of children the average 
woman will bear in her lifetime—have fallen well below the level 
needed to replace the existing population.3 Meanwhile, in the largest 
and more important developing countries, India and China, young 
men outnumber young women by scores of millions, and the gap 
between the sexes is growing.4 
Each trend is the aggregate result of hundreds of millions of 
increasingly autonomous reproductive decisions. When I refer to 
“reproductive autonomy,” I do not mean exclusively or even 
primarily the legally protected access to abortion and/or 
contraception that United States commentators tend to designate by 
 
impeccable authority. One can find versions of this anxiety on left and right alike. See, e.g., 
FOUAD AJAMI, THE DREAM PALACE OF THE ARABS 233 passim (1998) (describing the rise of 
nationalism in post-colonial Arab politics as destructive of customs of tolerance and pluralism); 
V.S. NAIPAUL, AMONG THE BELIEVERS 261, 297–305 (1981) (describing the development of 
a popular Islamic political identity in newly self-governing countries as pathological and 
violent); ASHIS NANDY, THE ILLEGITIMACY OF NATIONALISM: RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND 
THE POLITICS OF SELF 89–90 (1994) (discussing the recapitulation of colonial violence and 
submission in the politics of post-independence nationalism). The same question has re-
emerged in Iraq, where political chaos implies that no democratic center can hold, and across 
the Arab world, where pessimists predict that democracy would mean the end of already scant 
liberal rights and, in time, of elections as well. See, e.g., James Glanz, A Little Democracy or a 
Genie Unbottled?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 4.1 (discussing the victory of the Islamist 
party Hamas in Palestinian elections and asking whether political self-government is consistent 
with either liberty or order in illiberal settings). For a major recent statement of this concern, 
see FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND 
ABROAD (2003) (arguing that transitions from non-democratic to democratic rule are 
hazardous to liberal freedoms unless independent institutions have emerged to protect such 
freedoms, including civil society, reliable laws and courts, and orderly economic structures). 
 3. See, e.g., Europe’s Population Implosion, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 42. I discuss 
this trend and present sources at infra Part II.A. 
 4. See, e.g., VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 65, 131–32 (2004). I 
discuss this trend and present sources at infra Part II.B. 
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the term. I am deliberately referring to the whole suite of factors that 
make women and families inclined and able to exercise self-conscious 
agency in whether and when to bear children. In expanding the 
term, I am not trying to make any normative point about the 
desirability or adequacy of uses of the term that focuses on legal 
protections (although I have liberal views about the rights of 
contraception and abortion). I use the term analytically to describe 
autonomy in the substantive sense of the measure of control women 
and families can and do exercise over reproduction, as distinct from a 
focus exclusively on what they are legally permitted to do.5 Fertility 
rates are below replacement level where legal, economic, and social 
equality between the sexes and increasingly individualistic values 
induce people to choose careers and non-traditional intimate 
relationships over childrearing, and legal contraception and abortion 
enable them to enforce those choices.6 Asia’s sex disproportion 
comes from parents’ growing technological power to select their 
children’s sex through pre-natal testing and abortions of female 
fetuses, a preference that arises from both cultural attitudes and 
economic incentives.7 
 
 5. My discussions of freedom and autonomy throughout this article use a substantive 
rather than a legally formal sense of these terms, not because I reject the formal version, but 
because I find the substantive versions helpful in a productive engagement with the questions 
that drive the article. 
 6. See, e.g., Johan Surkyn & Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientations and the Second 
Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update, 
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (SPECIAL COLLECTION 3), Apr. 17, 2004, at 62–75. I develop this 
dimension of the argument throughout the article.  
 7. The knottiest part of my formulation is the characterization of sex-selective abortion 
as an expression of autonomy in China, where reproductive decisions are taken under the 
pressure of the state’s notorious population-control policies. For an introduction to the policy 
backdrop of this problem, see SUSAN GREENHALGH & EDWIN A. WINCKLER, GOVERNING 
CHINA’S POPULATION: FROM LENINIST TO NEOLIBERAL BIOPOLITICS 19–44 (2005) 
(describing the interaction of demographics and political power in China); id. at 166–201 
(presenting relevant policy developments under the present Hu government). It would have 
been possible to avoid this problem by simply cordoning off China from my discussion. India, 
Taiwan, and other Asian countries have sufficiently dramatic sex ratios that China is not an 
analytically necessary part of the story. However, I have chosen to include it for several reasons. 
First, it is in many respects, including differential cultural valuation of sons and daughters and 
the respective economic incentives to bear boys and girls, the same story as in non-
authoritarian regimes. Second, the sense in which I am using “freedom” or “autonomy” is not 
restricted to legal permission to act but includes the broader set of determinants of what one is, 
in fact, able to do with oneself and one’s life, which human potential one is able to realize in 
action. In this respect, the availability of the same sex-selection-enabling technologies in China, 
as in India and elsewhere, is an increase in autonomy, and the effect of that increase under 
relevant constraints is precisely what interests me. I draw this way of thinking about freedom 
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Both trends may have serious consequences for political order. 
Sub-replacement fertility threatens to cripple public pension systems 
by burdening shrinking numbers of working adults with the support 
of growing numbers of retirees.8 The one sure way to avoid this 
result—liberalizing immigration laws to let foreign-born workers 
replace never-born native workers—would be such a goad to 
xenophobic and nationalist politics that most observers regard it as 
politically impossible.9 Moreover, declining population historically 
inspires reactionary politics, with particular hostility toward women’s 
autonomy, in settings as diverse as Augustan Rome and eighteenth-
century France.10 
The other trend—disproportionately male populations, which 
implies large numbers of unmarried young men—is historically 
associated with growth in armies, military adventurism, and 
organized crime and social disorder. It is also allied with 
authoritarian and illiberal politics.11 Unmarried young men are the 
engines of nationalist and fundamentalist movements, which pose a 
threat to liberal and democratic prospects in the places where sex 
disproportion is most pronounced.12 In both cases, then, individual 
autonomy has systemic consequences that threaten to undermine the 
very features of political order that sustain autonomy.13 
 
from the work of Amartya Sen, which I briefly discuss at infra Part VI. Third, while political 
authoritarianism is a distinctive kind of evil—and I make no apologies for such a statement—it 
is my argument that reproductive decisions are made under a variety of constraints, some 
subtler than others, which interact with political freedom or repression in influencing the 
consequences of reproductive choice for demographics. Thus, I am interested in all the 
constraints that bear on reproductive decisions and on ways to overcome or mitigate them, not 
just in the decisions people make under “optimally free” or even approximately free 
circumstances. 
 8. See, e.g., Europe’s Population Implosion, supra note 3. I discuss this phenomenon 
much more fully at infra Parts II.A and V. 
 9. See, e.g., JONATHAN GRANT ET AL., LOW FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGEING 135 
(2004), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG206.pdf (“The sheer 
numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU and its 
Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in Europe.”). 
I address this issue further at infra Part II. 
 10. See CAROL BLUM, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: POPULATION, REPRODUCTION, AND 
POWER IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 1–4 (2002); TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND 
ROMAN SOCIETY 111–21 (1992) (outlining this perception, the evidence bearing on it, and 
the legal response).  
 11. I present this argument in full at infra Part III.C. 
 12. See id.  
 13. Having laid out the general shape of my argument, I owe the reader a word on why 
I say virtually nothing about the United States in an article aimed primarily at an American 
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These troubling paradoxes suggest that a picture of freedom’s 
prospects today requires an understanding of biopolitics. Biopolitics 
comprises the relationship between individuals’ control over their 
bodies and the power the political community may exercise over 
them: both the demands it may make (that they bear children, that 
they fight and die) and the prohibitions it may impose (no abortions, 
no second children). For the last sixty years, biopolitics has mainly 
concentrated on personal autonomy vis-à-vis state power, with signal 
examples being (in the direction of greater autonomy) abortion 
rights in the North Atlantic countries and reproductive freedom, and 
(in the direction of greater state coercion) authoritarian population 
control in China.14 The two trends that occasion this article differ in 
that they concern what might be called micro-politics: relations of 
relative power in spheres often regarded as peripheral to politics, 
particularly the family, which redound to more traditionally political 
problems. These trends are particularly ominous because they might 
be interpreted as reasons to condemn reproductive autonomy, the 
main focus of the last several decades of biopolitics in the West and, 
indeed, in much of the world. Sub-replacement fertility may be 
construed as evidence that the state should demand childbearing to 
avoid falling population—and, as my historical instances show, has 
been so construed in the past. Skewed sex ratios, similarly, may be 
offered as proof that certain populations are “not ready” to make 
 
legal audience. The United States displays none of the trends I discuss here in any neat form. 
The country’s overall fertility rate is ever so slightly below the replacement rate, but the 
population continues to expand because of rapid immigration that has been relatively 
uneventful politically. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIV., WORLD 
POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2004 REVISION 71 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD POPULATION 
PROSPECTS]. For the time being, that is, modestly more traditional family practices than 
Europe’s, combined with a significantly greater openness to immigration, seem to have 
enabled the United States to dodge the demographic bullet. American readers should 
nonetheless be interested in the argument here for several reasons: the future of the United 
States depends on the future of the rest of the world; neither our openness nor our relative 
fertility is irreversible; and, more optimistically, something like the American openness to 
immigration may be part of an optimistic medium-term to long-term scenario for third-
generation biopolitics. I resist simply prescribing that open attitude to relative xenophobic 
societies in this article simply because long-distance exhortations to change basic attitudes tend 
to fall on deaf or resentful ears. In the meantime, a comparative examination of fertility in the 
United States and Europe would be extremely interesting but would bulk up this article well 
beyond reasonable length. 
 14. I describe the development of biopolitics over the past several centuries in much 
greater detail at infra Part IV. 
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responsible reproductive choices and so should not enjoy 
reproductive autonomy. 
Against these anti-autonomy positions, I argue for an approach 
to biopolitics that is committed to deepening and extending 
women’s substantive freedom. This approach, which I outline in Part 
V, is oriented to solutions that acknowledge and, where possible, 
take advantage of new biopolitical realities. An approach committed 
to women’s substantive freedom seeks to ensure that women enjoy 
all dimensions of autonomy: literacy, workforce participation, 
empowerment in household decision-making, and capacity to 
reconcile childrearing and career. As I argue, these multiple 
dimensions of freedom interact in complementary fashion to mitigate 
troubling demographic trends and make reproductive freedom less 
disruptive of social order and intergenerational continuity.  
The two demographic crises demonstrate that the commitment 
to autonomy makes broader demands on the social order than has 
seemed clear before now. If my argument is right, that commitment 
should imply further commitment to creating and sustaining 
conditions in which reproductive autonomy is not self-undermining. 
Evidence from both Europe and Asia suggests that one variable that 
increases fertility rates in highly developed societies and improves the 
sex ratio of children in less developed societies is “women’s 
substantive freedom”: the set of choices available to women and the 
range of capabilities they can exercise. In Europe particularly, 
increases in substantive freedom come mainly through social policies 
that enable women to reconcile commitment to careers with 
commitment to childrearing.15 In developing countries, women’s 
literacy and workforce participation are the aspects of substantive 
freedom that bring improvements in sex ratios. More autonomy 
rather than less is the best answer to the threat that autonomy may 
undermine its own foundations.16 
 
 15. The formulation is not gender-neutral, but neither is the social reality. 
 16. This article extends the themes of two previous papers that deal with the relationship 
between freedom and property. In the first, I drew on the capabilities-oriented welfare 
economics of Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen, the reform proposals of political 
economist Hernando de Soto, law professor Yochai Benkler, and economist Robert Shiller to 
develop what I called a freedom-promoting approach to property reform. I argued that 
property regimes should maximize freedom, defined as capabilities: the power to make good 
one’s potential to act along all dimensions of human capacity. I filled out this prescription by 
proposing to give priority to two types of capabilities: foundational capabilities on which many 
others supervene, such as physical mobility; and meta-capabilities, such as literacy, which 
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Part II describes in detail the two demographic crises I have 
already sketched: the decline of fertility rates to well below 
replacement level in Europe and some other developed nations, and 
a disproportion in numbers of young women and men already 
totaling as many as one hundred million in India and China alone. I 
emphasize the practical social problems that these trends imply: the 
first, a vastly increased ratio of retirees to productive workers; the 
second, a large population of unmarried young men. Part III 
discusses the potential political implications of these demographic 
trends. In Part IV, I put the discussion in a historical frame, 
providing a brief history of modern biopolitics, beginning with 
Thomas Malthus and the eugenics movements of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries—exemplars of the long-held premise that 
the state had a legitimate interest in reproductive decisions. I then 
sketch the twentieth-century North Atlantic commitment to 
biopolitical autonomy with its origins in the horrors of the Second 
World War and pseudo-scientific racism, and in the rise of sex 
equality. 
I then turn to solutions. In Part V, I describe a model of 
“biopolitical public policy,” which both addresses the crises of 
biopolitics and seeks in its solutions to acknowledge and take 
advantage of biopolitical reality in novel ways. Specifically, I suggest 
that novel financial arrangements for international and 
intergenerational burden-sharing can mitigate the consequences of 
 
enable one to revise or expand one’s capabilities. In the second article, I enriched this account 
by developing an analysis of property regimes as the architecture of social relations, setting the 
terms on which people recruit one another to pursue ends ranging from survival and prosperity 
to more subtle forms of flourishing such as intimate relationships. The aim of that argument 
was to take seriously the fact that people’s capabilities are not monadic: what we can do 
depends on our power to recruit others to our ends, and on our susceptibility to others’ 
recruitment of us. Thus, to understand how a property regime shapes capabilities, it is 
necessary to appreciate the relationships of recruitment that it sets up, and so to think of 
freedom in a relational manner. The major innovation of that article was the argument that 
people display a double character in relations of recruitment. On the one hand, we are 
resources for one another’s projects, the objects of their enlistment and deployment. On the 
other hand, we are all bearers of our own purposes, wishes, and aims. Property regimes help to 
define the boundary between the ways others may recruit us as resources and the ways they are 
obliged to respect us as ends. The normative kernel of that article was that, to maximize 
freedom, property regimes should maximize reciprocity in interpersonal recruitment so that in 
enlisting one another to our aims, we must take account of others’ interests and commitments 
and envisage our own goals relative to theirs. This article extends the picture of people as both 
autonomous agents and resources for others’ ends by bringing in the perspective of the state 
and the imperatives of politics. 
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declining fertility and might greatly diminish them in combination 
with other responses. Part VI moves into the “core biopolitics” 
issues of reproduction and childrearing, arguing for the value of an 
enhanced conception of autonomy in addressing today’s 
demographic crises. Beginning with Europe, I present evidence 
suggesting that policies that increase substantive freedom by 
enabling women and families to reconcile commitment to work with 
the desire to rear children can raise fertility rates toward, if not to, 
the replacement level. Turning to India and China, I show that gains 
in women’s substantive freedom appear to be the only change that 
improves sex ratios. I also observe admittedly speculative, but 
nonetheless intriguing, reasons to hope that women’s substantive 
freedom might directly work against extremist politics. Part VII 
concludes. 
II. THE NEW BIOPOLITICS: TWO CRISES 
A. Sub-replacement Fertility and Rising Dependency Ratios  
For several decades in the last century, many believed that global 
population trends pointed ineluctably upward and that the social and 
ecological problems of overpopulation were among the most 
significant facing the species.17 At the beginning of the new 
millennium, the facts began to change rapidly. Global fertility, which 
in 1950–55 stood at about 5 children per woman, has fallen to 
2.65.18 In 2050 it is projected to be 2.05 children per woman, 
slightly below the replacement rate of 2.1.19 According to the 
Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, this trend would lead to a global population of 9.1 
billion by 2050, at which time growth rates would have slowed 
considerably and population would be close to leveling off.20 
Estimates premised on a faster decline in fertility rates show 
 
 17. See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 15–17 
(1990) (arguing that exponential growth in population has set the species on a sure path to 
exhausting the planet’s resources); PAUL H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968) 
(arguing the same).  
 18. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects: 
The 2004 Revision, 79 POPULATION NEWSL., June 2005, at 3. 
 19. Id. 
 20. WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at vi.  
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population stabilizing before 2040 at under 8 billion and beginning 
to decline by 2050.21 
For present purposes, the most interesting question is not global 
population but a pair of subsidiary trends: the geographic 
distribution of fertility decline and the ratio of working adults to 
dependents (children and the retired) in national populations. The 
fertility rate in developed countries now stands at 1.56 children per 
woman, significantly below the replacement rate.22 Moreover, 
fertility levels in all the world’s forty-four developed countries 
(except Albania) are below replacement rate, and those in fifteen 
countries (mainly in Southern and Eastern Europe) have fallen below 
1.3, a level “unprecedented in human history.”23 Even assuming 
continuing immigration and a substantial rebound in fertility rates 
(partly on the assumption that today’s low levels reflect a 
generational decision to delay childbearing rather than reject it 
outright), these figures will have such countries’ populations 
declining in absolute terms between now and 2050: by more than 
thirty million in Russia, over seven million in Italy, nearly four 
million in Germany, almost sixteen million in Japan, and over three 
million in South Korea.24 The projected decline for these countries 
ranges from over 20 percent of today’s population in Russia, 
through more than 10 percent for Italy, to around 5 percent in 
Germany.25 
Declining fertility may reflect the economic incentives of a 
system that expects parents to absorb most of the cost of raising 
children (in contrast to retirement, which is publicly subsidized). 
According to one recent estimate, the cost of raising a middle-class 
child in the United States is over a million dollars in the first 
 
 21. Id. at vii. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at viii. South Korea lies at 1.23, Poland at 1.26, Spain at 1.27, Italy at 1.28, 
Germany at 1.32, and Russia and Japan at 1.33. Id. at 67–70. By contrast, nine countries with 
high fertility and immigration rates are expected to account for more than half the world’s 
population increase before 2050. These include the political flashpoints of Pakistan, Nigeria, 
Congo, and Ethiopia, as well as India and China. The concentration of population growth in 
countries with unstable and potentially significant politics is itself an important and troubling 
matter, although outside the scope of this Article. 
 24. Id. at 35–37. 
 25. I have provided these numbers in round terms because so much uncertainty is 
absorbed into such estimates that rough magnitudes are more honest than an exaggerated 
precision premised on speculation. 
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seventeen years of life.26 More than 80 percent of that figure comes 
from forgone parental wages on the assumption that one parent 
gives up a $45,000 salary at the time of the child’s birth and remains 
out of the labor market until the child reaches seventeen; the 
opportunity cost in forgone wages rises to nearly $60,000 by the end 
of the period.27 These figures may be somewhat bloated—after all, 
two-career families are common—but they capture the outlines of a 
massive expense. 
Declining fertility also appears to reflect changes in values and 
priorities. Movement from traditional reproductive and family roles 
and toward new emphasis on career, self-expression, and the quality 
of friendship and romantic relationships all encourage postponing or 
skipping marriage and childbearing.28 A study of European values 
and family structures reveals that those who have adopted the 
individualist and counter-traditional values just enumerated are most 
likely to be single or involved in childless cohabitation, while 
traditionalists are most likely to have entered into childbearing 
marriages.29 The same study finds that the timing of European 
countries’ fertility declines below replacement level corresponds 
roughly to the timing of this transformation in values.30 A simpler 
statistical artifact of this change is a recent poll finding that, even 
absent economic constraint, German women on average express a 
wish for fewer than two children .31 
The effect of declining fertility rates is that as cohorts age, the 
proportion of older to younger people grows. Rising life expectancy 
amplifies the effect, as relatively large older populations stick around 
to keep younger and relatively smaller cohorts company. In Europe, 
the number of people of pensionable age for every 100 people of 
working age is projected to rise from 35 today to 75 in 2050, with 
one-to-one ratios in Italy and Spain.32 By another estimate, those 
 
 26. See PHILLIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE: HOW FALLING BIRTHRATES 
THREATEN WORLD PROSPERITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 73 (2004). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, supra note 6, at 62–75.  
 29. Id. at 70–72.  
 30. Id. at 47–48. 
 31. See Old Europe, Demographic Change, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 49–50. 
 32. Europe’s Population Implosion, supra note 3. 
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over 65 in Europe will be equivalent to 60 percent of the working-
age population in 2050.33 
The proximate result promises to be a very serious economic 
drag on countries already heavily burdened by public debt and slow 
economic growth. An aging population means an increase in 
spending on pensions and health care; a smaller working population 
must make a larger per capita contribution to support the retired and 
the sick. The European Commission has estimated that such 
payments may drive up public spending by five to eight percentage 
points of GDP by 2040 in the fifteen member countries of the 
European Union, crowding out spending on productive 
investments.34 Declining numbers of workers and reduced capital for 
investment mean, other things equal, a fall in economic growth. The 
International Monetary Fund has estimated that Europe’s annual 
growth rate will be a half percentage point lower in 2050 than 
now—a number too speculative to be meaningful, but which 
expresses the certainty that a shrinking working population putting 
an increased share of income into transfer payments cannot be good 
for growth.35 Taken together, diminished growth and the redirection 
of wealth to dependent populations will also crowd out spending on 
international influence, either via military power or through 
development assistance to new members of an expanded Europe and 
the world’s poorest countries. Summing up these prospects, the 
French Institute for International Relations has recently predicted 
that Europe faces “a slow but inexorable ‘exit from history.’”36 
B. “Bare Branches” and Sex Asymmetry 
In this sub-part, I treat the disproportion between men and 
women in populations where parents increasingly select the sex of 
their children.37 This problem is linked to declining fertility by a 
 
 33. Half a Billion Americans?—Demography and the West, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2002, 
at 20, 22. 
 34. Old Europe, supra note 31, at 49. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Europe’s Population Implosion, supra note 3. 
 37. There is considerable debate on the relative proportions of gender disproportion 
caused by each of a variety of factors. One class of factors expresses a preference for sons over 
daughters, exercised at different points in the cycle of conception and childhood: sex-selective 
abortion, infanticide, and preferential caregiving and medical expenditures resulting in higher 
levels of childhood mortality in girls than in boys. For an outline of the debate over 
proportions among these causes, see Chu Junhong, Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-
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common structure: systematic social consequences arise from 
individual reproductive choices. 
 
Selective Abortion in Rural China, 27 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 259 (2001) (observing 
that many Western observers were skeptical that sex-determination technology was widely 
available in China, while Chinese scholars resisted the suggestion that post-natal sex 
discrimination or infanticide caused the sex disparity). Today it is clear that China’s domestic 
production capacity makes possible widespread sex-determination technology, and reported 
levels of sex ratio at birth show such a dramatic disproportion that any post-natal addition to 
the ratio must be regarded as additional, not supplanting. Another candidate is inaccurate 
reporting: some suggest that births of girls are underreported, either because of low cultural 
valuation of females or because, under China’s one-child policy, parents who wish to have a 
son may conceal the birth of a daughter in an effort to avoid enforcement of the policy. For a 
discussion of this question, see Dudley L. Poston & Karen S. Glover, Too Many Males: 
Marriage Market Implications of Gender Imbalances in China 8–10 (unpublished paper, on file 
with author). As Poston and Glover note, however, Taiwan’s sex disproportion at birth 
approaches China’s despite near 100 percent reporting and no legal constraint on fertility, 
making underreporting seem unlikely to explain the bulk of China’s sex ratio. See id. at 9. 
Moreover, although reliable studies of the nominally illegal practices of prenatal sex-
determination and sex-selective abortion are difficult to come by, Junhong Chu’s study of one 
village in which she had earned the trust of participants showed high levels of both practices. 
See Chu, supra, at 270, 273 (reporting 39 percent use of ultrasound sex testing during first 
pregnancies, 55 percent use in second pregnancies, and 67 percent use in additional 
pregnancies; 29 percent of respondents reported at least one abortion, and 38 percent of that 
group reported at least one sex-selective abortion). A third candidate is, paradoxically, 
improving health overall. Many more male than female fetuses are conceived, but because 
female fetuses are hardier than males, the natural proportion at birth only slightly favors males. 
Hence, other things equal, an improvement in the health of pregnant women, which decreases 
the rate of fetal wastage (miscarriages and stillbirths), should increase the proportion of male 
fetuses. Dhairiyarayar Jayaraj & Sreenivasan Subramanian, Women’s Wellbeing and the Sex 
Ratio at Birth: Some Suggestive Evidence from India, 40 J. DEV STUD. NO. 5, 91 (June 1, 
2004). Although attractive for its note of optimism (perhaps not all news of sex disproportion 
is bad news!) and for its application of medical insight to social inquiry, this explanation cannot 
go far. The world’s richest countries, where fetal wastage rates are presumably much lower 
than in India or China, do not even approach the sex disproportions registered in those 
countries. Political economist Emily Oster has recently drawn attention for her argument that 
high rates of hepatitis B contribute to sex disproportion by inducing higher rates of male births 
and female births; but Oster admits that hepatitis B cannot account for increases in sex 
disproportion over the last fifteen years, when infection rates have stabilized or fallen. Emily 
Oster, Hepatitis B and the Case of the Missing Women 2–3 (March 2005), 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/grad_student/007.pdf. Oster makes no claim that 
hepatitis B could account for more than a fraction of the phenomenon. Other researchers, 
notably Amartya Sen, have sounded extremely cautious notes about her findings, which, 
although interesting, are far from conclusive. See Eve Conant, What Carried the Girls Away, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 12, 2006, at 27 (quoting Sen’s skeptical assessment). On the existing 
evidence, it is very difficult to get away from the conclusion that sex-selective abortions and 
gender bias in childrearing play a large role in shaping existing sex ratios. 
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1. The growth of the bare branches 
A disproportion of men to women in Asian populations—the 
result of sex-selective caregiving, infanticide, and, increasingly, 
abortion—came to widespread attention in 1990 when the 
economist Amartya Sen (future Nobel laureate) reported his 
calculation that, relative to the natural proportion of male to female 
births, more than one hundred million women were “missing” 
worldwide.38 The natural sex ratio produces a slightly higher number 
of women than men in a population.39 By contrast, today’s actual sex 
ratio in China shows 106.7 men for each 100 women, and India’s 
107.2 men per 100 women.40 The gap between expected and actual 
sex ratios translates to more than forty million “missing women” in 
China’s population of roughly 1.2 billion and more than thirty-nine 
million among India’s roughly 1 billion people. 
Many interwoven factors account for parental sex selection in 
India: the higher status attached to male children, the superior 
earning potential of men over women (with its corollary, greater 
capacity to support parents and other family members), and the cost 
of providing a bride’s dowry.41 A nationwide study conducted in 
1997 found that Indian parents on average describe a 2:1 ratio of 
sons to daughters as the optimal mix—a preference plainly 
incompatible with natural sex ratios.42 India’s southern states, which 
enjoy higher literacy rates than the rest of the country, exhibit the 
least distortion in their sex ratios.43 Kerala, with near-universal 
literacy, many female-headed households, and a net out-migration of 
males for work, is unique in having significantly more women than 
men in its population; however, neighboring Tamil Nadu has a ratio 
of just over 101 men per 100 women, and Karnataka, home to 
 
 38. See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Dec. 20, 1990, at 61–66. Subsequent studies have modestly reduced his estimates, chiefly 
because he used sub-Saharan African births as a baseline, and the share of women among births 
in that population is slightly higher than for other groups. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra 
note 4, at 58–59.  
 39. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 59–61. 
 40. Id. at 62. Similar numbers prevail in Pakistan (108.6) and Afghanistan (106.5), with 
slightly less dramatic figures in Bangladesh (103.8) and Taiwan (104.3). Id. 
 41. See id. at 65–80. 
 42. See id. at 73. 
 43. See id. at 92. 
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Bangalore, has a ratio somewhat under 104:100.44 The national sex 
ratio at birth ranged from 109.8 to 113.8:100 between 1987 and 
1998. 
Two factors that promote reproductive autonomy appear also to 
have contributed to India’s present sex asymmetry. One is the 
increased availability and decreased cost of prenatal sex-
determination testing and abortion. Between 1982 and 1987 alone, 
the number of sex-determination clinics in Bombay rose from 10 to 
248.45 Amniocentesis, which cost the equivalent of $88 to $117 in 
the 1980s, now costs $12 to $30—a lot of money in a poor country, 
but also a huge decrease in cost for the poor.46 Ads for sex-
determination testing suggest the cost is worthwhile: “Better [500 
rupees] now than . . . [500,000 rupees] later,” they warn, adverting 
to the potential cost of a daughter’s dowry.47 
Although there is dispute in India over how much of the 
country’s sex disproportion arises from abortion and how much from 
neglect of female infants, the sex bias in abortion is manifest.48 A 
Bombay study of one thousand abortions found 97 percent were of 
females, a number that seems implausibly high.49 A study of a 
hospital in Punjab in the 1980s and 1990s found that 13.6 percent 
of mothers of newborn boys admitted—with reticence that may 
suggest underreporting—had undergone pre-natal sex-selection; the 
comparable figure was 2.1 percent for mothers of girls.50 The other 
female fetuses presumably were not carried to term. 
The second interaction between reproductive autonomy and sex 
disproportion is that falling fertility rates, with their connection to 
increasingly mobile, expressive, and individualist modes of life, 
exacerbate sex disproportion.51 Fertility rates have fallen dramatically 
in most of India, albeit from a high baseline.52 Monica das Gupta 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 110. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. For a start on the dispute, see id. at 112–13. 
 49. Id. at 111. 
 50. Id. at 112. 
 51. For a discussion of this cultural dimension of declining fertility, see Surkyn & 
Lesthaeghe, supra note 6. 
 52. India’s current fertility rate stands at 3.07 children per woman, down from 5.43 in 
1970–75. United Nations demographers predict a decline below replacement level in 2030–
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and P.N. Mari Bhat have found that falling fertility intensifies the 
pressure for sex selection because the total number of children that 
parents want falls faster than the number of sons they desire.53 In 
consequence, carrying a female infant to term diminishes the chances 
of reaching the desired number of sons more dramatically for a 
family desiring a small number of children than for a family that 
wants a larger number of children. Consequently, where both 
economic interest and social esteem produce a strong preference for 
male over female children (or, more precisely, a preference for a mix 
of male and female children that falls well off the biological 
distribution), the broadly liberalizing trends that produce falling 
fertility rates also increase the likelihood of sex-selective abortion 
and, other things equal, will increase sexual disproportion. 
China is the source of the term “bare branches,” which refers to 
“surplus men” who will never be able to marry in countries of 
“missing women.” As noted, China’s male-female ratio is 106.7:100, 
and its “missing women” total about forty million.54 The sex ratio 
for the population overall understates the sex disproportion among 
the young, because China’s disproportion has grown a great deal in 
recent years.55 Official Chinese publications put the ratio for children 
under age five at 118:100.56 The introduction of ultrasound 
technology for prenatal sex identification in the 1980s seems to have 
increased the sex disproportion; an official ban on prenatal sex 
identification has had uncertain effects as yet.57 As in India, the 
preference for sons is powered by esteem (sons are higher-status than 
daughters and are guarantors of family continuity) and by economic 
interest (men are chief wage-earners and, above all, providers for 
their parents’ retirement).58 The government’s notorious one-child 
policy restricts the number of births in which families may attempt to 
 
35, but that is nearly pure speculation. WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at 
68. 
 53. See Monica Das Gupta & P.N. Mari Bhat, Fertility Decline and Increased 
Manifestation of Sex Bias in India, 51 POPULATION STUD. 307, 307–15 (1997). 
 54. HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 58–59. 
 55. See id. at 131–32. 
 56. Id. at 132. 
 57. See id. at 171–73. 
 58. See id. at 155. Hudson and den Boer quote anthropologist Sulamith Heins Potter as 
describing living conditions for retirees without children who rely on government support as 
“pitiable,” noting that “these old men and women live in decrepit buildings with little food 
and must depend on the goodwill of neighbors to provide water and fuel.” Id. 
PURDY.PP2.DOC 10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM 
889] The New Biopolitics 
 905 
reach the desired number of sons.59 The Chinese setting is thus a 
striking combination of traditional state coercion and technologically 
enabled reproductive autonomy, and of authoritarian biopolitics and 
the problems of new biopolitics. 
2. The consequences of sex disproportion 
The inevitable consequence of sex disproportion is that, 
assuming the wish to marry is at least as frequent in men as in 
women, there will be many reluctant bachelors. Hudson and den 
Boer estimate conservatively that by 2020 China will be home to 
between twenty-nine million and thirty-three million “surplus males” 
between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four.60 Their estimates for 
India range between twenty-eight million and thirty-two million 
bare branches.61 Even in the conservative range, these numbers raise 
the prospect of more than fifty million young men in the world’s 
most populous countries who will be reluctantly unable to marry or 
become fathers. 
What is a large population of unmarried young men likely to 
mean? There are several parts to the answer. First, unmarried men 
are statistically likely to belong to the lowest socioeconomic classes, 
to be underemployed or unemployed, and to be relatively transient 
because of both their need to move for work and their lack of family-
based community ties.62 Second, according to historical sociologists, 
they tend to associate with other bachelors in loose societies of 
laborers, transients, adventurers, or ne’er do wells.63 The subcultures 
 
 59. In practice, the policy has been unevenly enforced, and where it is enforced the 
policy amounts in effect to a ban on second children in urban areas and on third children in 
rural areas, with significant dispensations for China’s ethnic minorities. See id. at 152–54. 
 60. Id. at 186. 
 61. See id. at 124. 
 62. See id. at 188–90. Except for the absence of family-based community ties, these 
characteristics present a serious ambiguity in the direction of causation: men are not born 
bachelors but become such, and men with limited aptitude, family wealth, and social capital are 
likely to fare poorly in the marriage market. Thus, while bachelorhood may exacerbate the 
characteristics just sketched, it is plausible that the chief dynamic at work is that a surplus of 
men means the least marriageable will be channeled into bachelorhood. 
 63. See id. at 190–92 (summarizing a large amount of historical material on the 
characteristics of bachelor populations). For particularly significant sources, see DAVID T. 
COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE FRONTIER 
TO THE INNER CITY (1996); James F. Rooney, Societal Forces and the Unattached Male: An 
Historical Review, in DISAFFILIATED MAN: ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SKID ROW, 
VAGRANCY, AND OUTSIDERS (Howard M. Bahr ed., 1970). 
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that develop in these groups are prone to drug and alcohol abuse, 
violence, norms of extreme sensitivity to insult, and risk-taking 
behavior of all sorts.64 Third, unless they move into monastic or 
other orders that provide social integration without marriage, bare 
branches maintain a relatively alienated attitude toward settled 
society and sometimes fall into an oppositional and opportunistically 
predatory stance. Hudson and den Boer follow a number of 
historical scholars in suggesting that “surplus males,” seeking outlets 
for ambition and energy, populated Chinese and Indian bandit 
troops, freelance Chinese armies that spurred disastrous rebellions, 
and Portuguese rogue aristocrats who preyed on peasants and led 
expansionary overseas adventures.65 
These general claims appear to line up with present reality in 
India and China. Amartya Sen has observed that inter-regional 
contrasts in India reveal “a strong—and statistically very significant—
relation between the female-male ratio in the population and the 
scarcity of violent crimes.”66 Although the precise figures are 
debated, millions of Chinese are transient, semi-employed, semi-legal 
laborers known collectively as the “floating population,” thought to 
be seventy to eighty percent male and largely unmarried.67 
In this Part, I have summarized two unsettling demographic 
trends: declining fertility and increasingly unequal sex ratios. Both 
have systemic and troubling consequences: respectively, rising 
dependency rates and stresses on public pension systems, and 
unmarriageable male populations lacking clear paths to settled and 
productive adulthood. I now turn to the specifically political 
consequences of these trends. 
 
 64. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 192–200 (summarizing material on 
these populations). For significant sociobiological accounts of this pattern, see Allan Mazur & 
Alan Booth, Testosterone and Dominance in Men, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 353 (1998); Allan 
Mazur & Joel Michalek, Marriage, Divorce, and Male Testosterone, 77 SOC. FORCES 315 
(1998); Christian G. Mesquida & Neil I. Wiener, Human Collective Aggression: A Behavioral 
Ecology Perspective, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 247 (1996). 
 65. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 200–02, 207–27, and sources cited 
therein. 
 66. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 200 (1999). 
 67. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 230–38 (noting the widespread 
association of this population with crime and alcoholism). 
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III. DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL THREAT 
A. The Pattern of Pro-natalist Politics 
Declining fertility, or the perception of declining fertility, is not 
new, even if it has never been so widespread or dramatic as it is now. 
In past episodes, an unsettling pattern has recurred. Pro-natalist 
agitators have identified culture, values, or preferences—pick your 
vocabulary—as the source of declining fertility and issued polemics 
against them. Pro-natalist polemicists tend to favor a homogenous, 
hierarchical, and “virtuous” version of national community. This 
form of pro-natalist politics has consistently identified the moral 
health of the political community with its fertility rate. It has 
consequently picked out three principles as diseases on the body 
politic: individualism, with its stress on personal satisfaction and 
development over reproduction; pluralism, the acknowledgement of 
valid forms of life that do not honor family and reproduction 
foremost; and, above all, women’s equality. 
I give two historical instances, one from Imperial Rome, the 
other from eighteenth-century France. While historical analogies 
cannot be said to “prove” anything about the probable results of 
present trends, they do serve two purposes. First, they illustrate 
vividly the texture of cultural events, such as reactionary pro-natalist 
politics, that would otherwise be mere dry forecasts. Second, because 
they arise from circumstances in some ways similar to ours, they 
evoke recurrent tendencies that may reveal something about human 
reactions to circumstances that recur too seldom and with too much 
irreducible variety to serve as the basis for social-science 
generalizations.68 
I have selected two examples remote from each other and from 
the present because they represent a recurrent ideological pattern in 
pro-natalist politics. An actual or perceived decline in fertility draws 
 
 68. This observation squares with one that Jared Diamond has recently made about the 
value of historical case studies in seeking to make tentative social-science generalizations. While 
there are “too many potentially independent variables and far too few separate outcomes to 
establish those variables’ importance statistically,” there are also “huge quantities of 
information about the sequence of steps connecting initial conditions to outcomes.” In other 
words, dense information about specific events can help inform scholars about recurrent 
patterns of cultural response to ecological or, in this case, biological events. See JARED 
DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 194 (2005). 
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attention to values and practices that take people away from 
reproduction: pluralism, individualism, luxury, effeminacy, and 
women’s empowerment, all polemically portrayed as decadence. The 
new visibility of non-reproductive ways of living raises the possibility 
that repopulation from generation to generation is not automatic; 
that fertility depends on a culture that honors reproduction and laws 
that reward it. Two responses are typical. First, political actors assert 
a state interest in reproductive choices. Reproduction is now styled a 
political as well as a natural duty, and the citizen or subject is 
sometimes portrayed as the property of the state, a part of its stock of 
natural resources. Second comes an assault—polemical at the most 
modest and sometimes legally coercive—on non-reproductive 
cultural forms: luxury, individualism, and any sexual practice that 
does not produce offspring. This way of asserting the priority of state 
or social interests over individual choice in intimate matters gives 
pro-natalist politics an affinity with modern forms of authoritarian 
and totalitarian politics, particularly the fascist apotheosis of the 
nation. 
In Rome during the age of the emperor Augustus, a widespread 
perception arose that the Roman elite were failing to reproduce. In 
this polemical view, elites preferred sensual indulgence to 
childbearing and pursued that preference through refusal to marry, 
contraception, abortion, exposure (abandonment) of newborns, and 
infanticide.69 Augustus responded with a decree directing each 
citizen to produce at least three children and granting certain 
benefits to those who met this standard while punishing the 
unmarried and the childless with penalties such as restrictions on 
their right to inherit.70 This state claim on the reproductive capacity 
of the citizenry was accompanied by a genre of declensionist 
polemics, complaining that the once virile and fecund Roman people 
had become effeminate, self-indulgent, and infertile.71 The attack was 
 
 69. See TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND ROMAN SOCIETY 111–21, 126–27 (1992) 
(outlining this perception, the evidence bearing on it, and the legal response). 
 70. Id. at 115–16 (noting that many ambiguities surround this decree, prominently 
whether “three children” refers to the number born or the number surviving, and that we 
know little for certain about the frequency and severity of its enforcement). 
 71. See id. at 120 (“Literary, moralistic references abound where [having no children at 
all] is seen as disgraceful but, by implication, widespread. . . . Pliny the Elder explicitly 
condemns contemporary morals, according to which [the status of being childless and 
unmarried] occupies the place of highest [authority] and [power] . . . in sharp contrast (so he 
would have us believe) to the ‘good old days.’”). 
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not only on self-indulgent men but also on increasingly autonomous 
upper-class women, whose wealth and legal rights gave them a 
measure of control over reproductive decisions, which they pressed 
to the hilt, collaborating with or perhaps overcoming their husbands 
in declining to bear children.72 The polemical target was thus male 
individualism as well as the relative emancipation of female citizens. 
Eighteenth-century France recapitulated the Roman pattern. For 
much of the eighteenth century it was widely believed that France 
was losing population.73 Picking up ancient tropes linking the virtue 
of kings to the fertility of their people, critics of the monarchy seized 
on the perceived fertility collapse for polemical advantage.74 
Philosophes and republicans developed sociological attacks on the 
king, arguing against values and behavior that supposedly undercut 
fertility, which they associated with the wealthy and aristocratic allies 
of the monarchy.75 The most frequent objects of attack were 
“libertines,” aristocratic men who, like their Roman predecessors, 
preferred the wealth, freedom, and episodic sexual gratification of a 
bachelor (and sometimes a “sodomite”) existence to the duties of 
fatherhood.76 In the years before the French Revolution, “the 
language employed to denounce celibacy became increasingly harsh, 
the proposals more Draconian.”77 
This critique was crystallized in an assault on “luxury,” a line of 
attack shared by the Marquis de Mirabeau, the abbe Charles-Andre-
Alexandre de Moy, and the conservative Melchior Grimm, among 
many others.78 In this account, “luxury” stood for a preference for 
social standing and the pleasures of consumption and self-cultivation 
over the expenses and burdens of childrearing.79 Mirabeau proposed 
a graduated luxury consumption tax to redirect resources from 
 
 72. See LONGMAN, supra note 26, at 151–69 (outlining the patterns of cultural reaction 
to declining fertility).  
 73. In fact, the opposite was true; mostly because mortality rates were falling, but 
shrinking family sizes and the beginning of rural emigration to towns and cities produced the 
impression of a desolated land. See BLUM, supra note 10, at 1–4 (2002). 
 74. See id. at 5–6.  
 75. See id. at 21–60. 
 76. See id. at 26–27. 
 77. Id. at 43. 
 78. See id. at 45–51. 
 79. See id. at 46 (“[T]he preference for ensuring a comfortable style of life rather than 
producing the largest possible number of children was increasingly and virulently denounced as 
morally reprehensible.”). 
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pleasure and display to production and reproduction.80 Georges-M. 
Butel-Dumont contended in 1771 that the state must go farther and 
punish those who remained unmarried.81 Another polemicist argued, 
“[i]f it is illegal to commit suicide because that means robbing the 
Fatherland of oneself, it should be all the more so to stay single 
because each citizen is obliged to contribute . . . his share in [the 
nation’s] perpetuation.”82 As in imperial Rome, these proposals 
envisaged a direct and powerful claim of the state on the 
reproductive capacity of the individual citizen and embraced 
authoritarian, even proto-totalitarian, regulation to enforce the 
claim.83 
Reactionary gender politics accompanied the French pro-natalist 
agenda. One polemical target was the alleged effeminacy of wealthy 
and especially aristocratic men, portrayed as wigged, made-up, 
mincing, and clad in silk.84 Another was the autonomy of upper-class 
women who, presumably under the influence of luxurious appetites, 
avoided childbearing to preserve themselves for other pleasures. The 
pro-natalist Mirabeau described a flighty and self-indulgent new 
mother of a first child, a daughter, who declares of her disinclination 
to take on another pregnancy: “The job is dreadful . . . and I don’t 
feel like sacrificing myself for my posterity.”85 Such gender-specific 
polemics have particularly ominous political implications. The literal 
occupation of a woman’s body by the child in utero and the 
substantial hazard of childbearing (particularly before the advent of 
modern medicine) both give pro-natalist legislation an aspect of 
intimate coercion.86 
 
 80. See id. at 48–49. 
 81. See id. at 49.  
 82. Id. (quoting ANGE GOUDAR, LES INTERETS DE LA FRANCE MAL ENTENDUS DANS 
LES BRANCHES DE L’AGRICULTURE, DE LA POPULATION, DES FINANCES ET DE L’INDUSTRIE, 
PAR UN CITOYEN 272 (Amsterdam, 1756)). 
 83. Blum provides a number of other striking instances. An anonymous pamphleteer in 
1763 wrote that “[l]ibertinage . . . kills millions by preventing the propagation of the species.” 
The abbe Jacques-Joseph Duguet declared, “[a]nything opposed to fecundity, even if it’s only 
the wish, is criminal and degrades marriage . . . .” According to F.B. Felice, “Onanism is 
opposed to the natural destination of sperm . . . the one who engages in it becomes his own 
murderer. Still more criminal is the [onanism] committed in marriage.” Id. at 50–51. 
 84. See id. at 49. 
 85. See id. at 47. 
 86. This intuition forms the basis of Jed Rubenfeld’s anti-totalitarian argument for 
abortion rights. See Jed Rubenfeld, Concurring in the Judgment Except As to Doe, in WHAT 
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S 
PURDY.PP2.DOC 10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM 
889] The New Biopolitics 
 911 
The French Revolution carried many of these polemical themes 
into political struggle and legislation. When the laws of February 13–
19, 1790 abolished clerical vows of chastity, the speaker of the 
Assembly declared that the country could no longer tolerate infertile 
celibacy: “for reasons both moral and demographic . . . there are 
100,000 young women who must be married.”87 Legislative assaults 
on the infertile laity were less decisive, but the deputies issued both 
pro-natalist policies and rhetoric. A decree of 1791 took the tack of 
today’s pro-natalist incentives, reducing personal taxes on the fathers 
of more than three children.88 The post-Terror constitution of 1795 
excluded the abstentious from the highest levels of government, 
providing that “no one may be elected to the Conseil de Anciens . . . 
unless he is married or widowed,” that is, unless he had made a 
good-faith effort to join the chain of social reproduction.89 The 
deputy Louis Depuy announced, “The citizen is the property of the 
Fatherland and a part of its wealth”—a radical extension of the 
premises of first-generation biopolitics—and urged that childless 
unions be declared invalid.90 Another deputy, Charles F. Bouche, 
denounced all unmarried persons as “parasites, in general corrupt or 
corrupting . . . a useless weight on the face of the earth.”91 
This is the pattern of pro-natalist politics. There is not significant 
evidence that this pattern is recurring in any important way in 
Europe or Japan today. I suggest later that this may be partly a 
consequence of women’s well-established equality and partly a result 
of continuing revulsion at the eugenic policies of the last century.92 
These are early days, however, and it would be naïve to imagine that 
the same political pattern could not recur as the effects of declining 
 
MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 109, 111 (Jack Balkin ed., 2005) [hereinafter WHAT ROE 
V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID] (“A woman’s right not to be impressed into unwanted labor is 
no less than a man’s. . . . [N]o law could more plainly violate this right than a law forcing a 
woman to bear a child.”). 
 87. BLUM, supra note 10, at 158–59. 
 88. See id. at 159. 
 89. Id. at 163. 
 90. Id. at 158. 
 91. Id. at 159. Examples abound outside the opinions of lawmakers. In 1794, represent-
tatives of a popular society called (in a twist of retrospective irony) Condom addressed the 
Convention, complaining that “regenerated France is still crawling with bachelors” and urging 
a declaration “that celibacy is a political crime” and institution of “a heavy punishment upon 
those guilty of it.” Id. at 162. 
 92. See infra Part IV.B.  
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fertility become increasingly palpable. Other connections between 
demographic crisis and illiberal politics, while less richly instanced in 
history, are less speculative today. 
B. The Politics of Pensions and Immigration 
An obvious response to the increase in dependency ratios is to 
increase immigration of working-age adults and permit them to 
stand in for the “absent” native-born adults of a population with 
sub-replacement fertility levels. This option, however, would likely 
set in motion a political crisis. Immigration on a scale that would 
prevent dependency ratios from rising would be much greater than 
developed countries have so far embraced. According to a United 
Nations estimate, Germany would need to admit 3.6 million 
immigrants per year between now and 205093 (against a baseline of 
roughly 80 million inhabitants94) to keep dependency rates 
constant.95 The corresponding figure would be even more dramatic 
in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Japan, where a substantial 
decline in absolute population is now projected.96 
The numerical challenge is the least of the difficulties attending 
immigration. Germany and the rest of Europe have been politically 
fractured over current immigration levels, which are too small to 
make much of a dent in their dependency ratios. In light of these 
political constraints, the Rand Corporation’s European division has 
concluded that public policy needed to focus on influencing 
domestic fertility because “[t]he sheer numbers of immigrants that 
are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU and its 
Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political 
climate prevailing in Europe,” 97 a judgment that preceded the 
politically explosive riots among France’s North African immigrants 
in fall of 2005. 
Policymakers confront two other options, neither politically 
attractive. The first is a substantial increase in the age of eligibility for 
public pensions,98 the second a harsh cut in the level of pension 
 
 93. WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at 35. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Old Europe, supra note 31. 
 96. See id. at 36–38.  
 97. See GRANT ET AL., supra note 9, at 135. 
 98. See Old Europe, supra note 31. 
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benefits. While such reform has succeeded on the margins, 
particularly in the United States, any changes that approached 
offsetting the increased cost from demographic change would likely 
be political dynamite. The recent stillbirth of Social Security reform 
(even in the relatively market-oriented United States) in a time of 
conservative ascendancy suggests the difficulty of revising this class of 
entitlements.99 So does the long-running German stalemate between 
the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, which has so far 
blocked any serious reform of that country’s disaster-bound welfare-
spending commitments.100 
Increased immigration has thus emerged as a visible option in 
discussions of fertility decline, not so much to point the way to a 
solution as to highlight the newly paradoxical relationship between 
two aspects of national identity in Europe and Japan: social solidarity 
in the form of a generous welfare policy and the expectation of 
ethnic homogeneity.101 It was an implicit premise of those countries’ 
welfare policies that benefits would go to people with whom 
taxpayers identified—a pattern of ethno-national spending that 
neared perfection in West Germany’s nearly overwhelming decision 
to absorb the former East Germany into its welfare state. It now 
begins to seem that nothing like the current level of social support 
can continue unless Europe gives up even today’s relative 
homogeneity in favor of becoming a continent of immigrant 
societies.102 To take that path, though, would force the question of 
 
 99. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Why Conservatives Are Divided, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, 
at A19 (“Social Security reform appears to be dead for now.”). 
 100. See Edmund L. Andrews, German Parliament Votes To Revamp Pension System, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 12, 2001, at A4 (discussing Germany’s halting efforts at reform); Mark Landler, 
An Unlikely German Coalition Now Seems To Be More Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at 
A8 (noting the continuing deadlock in German electoral politics). 
 101. For a discussion of the relationship between nationalist sentiment and social 
solidarity with particular reference to the contrasting political cultures of the United States and 
Germany, see MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND 
THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 220–32 (1995). For the perspective of a leading 
German political theorist and public intellectual on this question, see Jurgen Habermas, Open 
Letter on Europe, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 31, 2003 (arguing that an ethos 
of social solidarity forms the basis of Europe’s rejection of severe inequality). Sociologist 
Anthony Giddens makes a similar argument about the essentially cultural-conservative basis of 
European social solidarity in Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton in Conversation, in ON THE 
EDGE: LIVING WITH GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1, 31–33 (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 
2001). 
 102. As the immediately preceding discussion and sources cited therein indicate, the 
claim here is not that Europe is in fact homogenous, but that the national political cultures of 
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whether welfare-state solidarity could survive absent ethno-national 
solidarity, or whether the continent’s transformation by immigration 
would transform its political cultures into less solidaristic, more 
laissez-faire societies. The second option would push European 
countries in the direction of the United States, where relatively open 
immigration co-exists with minimal entitlements, so that the country 
takes on a low burden of solidarity—whether measured in fiscal 
obligations or in collective identification—by admitting foreigners.103 
The politics that worked out this question would inevitably 
interact with existing rifts over the place of immigrants in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and other European countries. Although 
forecasting specific developments in political cultures is usually a 
fruitless game—particularly across an ocean and at the scale of 
continents—a crisis of solidarity and ethno-national identity suggests 
a perfect storm for reactionary conceptions of the national 
community as ethnically homogeneous, superior in virtue, and under 
threat in its defining traditions and character. 
This is a speculative discussion, but not a wildly imaginative one. 
The most fractious themes of Europe’s domestic politics are 
immigration and the future of the welfare state. Both raise charged 
questions about the nature of national community: who “we” are, 
what we owe one another, and what the two questions have to do 
with each other. Fertility decline brings the two issues face to face in 
a manner that may tend to make ideas of national community more 
rigid and reactionary at the very moment that practical exigencies 
make national populations more heterogeneous. 
C. Sex Disproportion and Politics 
The most interesting and novel question to arise from sex 
disproportion is what it will mean for the very important political 
transitions that China and India are now undergoing. In a time when 
“the future of Western political theory will be decided outside the 
West,” the development of electoral democracy in India, democratic-
 
Europe are far from finding a way to reconcile the fact of growing heterogeneity with the 
longstanding commitment to generous social supports. 
 103. Immigration has recently increased in political salience in the United States, driven 
not so much by disputes over public benefits as over access to the American job market—the 
main economic good that the United States provides its new arrivals. See, e.g.. Shia Kapos & 
Paul Giblin, Rallies Sound the Drumbeat on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A18 
(describing demonstrations and counter-demonstrations on immigration law reform).  
PURDY.PP2.DOC 10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM 
889] The New Biopolitics 
 915 
tending reform in China, and market institutions in both countries 
are of great moment.104 Stakes are high for the well-being of the 
more than two billion people who inhabit those countries, for the 
geo-political order they will either anchor or disrupt, and—as the 
quotation just given suggests—for the future of the very institutional 
forms China and India are now pursuing and revising. 
The first possible consequence concerns the status of women in 
society. To the extent that gender equality is a normative aim of 
liberal and democratic institutions and an empirical contributor to 
the development of these institutions, resurgent gender hierarchy is 
bad for political development.105 Unhappily, sex disproportion can 
be bad for women’s status. As women become relatively scarce, men 
increase competition to control them, which tends to produce early 
marriage, high levels of direct discipline of women by men, and, for 
the most vulnerable women, increased levels of kidnapping, sale as 
brides, and prostitution.106 Although a formalist trained in the 
rudiments of economics might imagine the contrary consequence—
that increased demand for women relative to supply would increase 
the bargaining power of the women themselves—a bit of realist 
reflection reveals the problem.107 Scarcity increases bargaining power 
only when women are recognized as formal equals in bargaining, or 
 
 104. SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA 198 (1997).  
 105. I take up this question further at infra Part VI.A. 
 106. See Scott J. South & Katherine Trent, Sex Ratios and Women’s Roles: A Cross-
National Analysis, 93 AM. J. SOC. 1096, 1096–115 (1988).  
 107. What I have just called a realist attitude would follow the classic analysis of legal 
realist Robert Hale in describing private economic transactions as relations of mutual coercion 
in which bargaining position depends on the parties’ respective capacity to bring threats to 
bear on one another. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF 
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 3–34, 385–99 (1952) (diagnosing property rights as 
establishing economic relationships of reciprocal threat and exploring modes of legal 
mitigation and equalization of threat). Joseph W. Singer has continued to do important and 
theoretically ambitious work in Hale’s vein. See Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in 
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 650–51 (1988) (“As Hale tried to teach us, every transaction 
takes place against a background of property rights. And the definition, allocation, and 
enforcement of those entitlements represent social decisions about the distribution of power 
and welfare. No transaction is undertaken outside this sphere of publicly delegated power; the 
public sphere defines and allocates the entitlements that are exchanged in the private sphere. At 
the core of any private action is an allocation of power determined by the state.”). One might 
also look at the issue as a matter of cultural or interpretive context, as Charles Taylor does in 
describing negotiation as involving a number of implicit presuppositions, including the nature 
and value of the persons involved. See Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 
in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15, 32–33 (1985).  
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at least are practically able to withhold the resources they control. 
When the holder of the resource—in this case, a woman’s own 
person—cannot withhold it because of legal disability or material 
vulnerability, an increase in the value of the resource means a greater 
chance that she will be coerced into giving it up. Thus, there may be 
an unhappy relationship between sex disproportion and resurgent 
hierarchy in gender relations where, as in both India and China, 
women’s positions are already subordinate and vulnerable.108 
The second possible consequence is the rise of potentially anti-
democratic and illiberal institutions, either to absorb populations of 
unmarried men or to address the anti-social behavior associated with 
such men. The military is the foremost public institution suited to 
absorb unmarried populations; a large and restive military is also an 
independent political actor with potentially anti-democratic goals. 
These goals may or may not extend to coups or other overt power 
struggles. They may well include pressure for destabilizing 
adventures intended to establish—for reasons of both funding and 
status—the importance of the military. The potential for overt power 
struggles is particularly great in government made vulnerable by the 
uncertainties of political reform, as China seems increasingly to be; 
the potential for dangerous adventurism is manifest in China’s 
relations with Taiwan and India’s with Pakistan. 
Domestic police forces are also likely to grow in response to 
unmarried male populations. China announced in 1999 that it would 
substantially increase the size of the People’s Armed Force, which is 
charged with “maintain[ing] internal stability by quelling domestic 
unrest and rioting.”109 The increase was a response to labor and 
political unrest, some of it associated with the transient population. 
Interestingly, unmarried men may be the members of the People’s 
Armed Force as well as its targets: the new recruits have been 
described as “the dregs” of current army personnel. Any armed locus 
of authority, particularly one that works at the intersection of 
ordinary law-and-order and political repression, can pose a danger to 
liberal and democratic political development. 
Perhaps the most troubling question is whether unmarried 
young men are particularly likely recruits for extremist movements, 
 
 108. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 74; see also id. at 73 (noting women’s 
low rates of literacy and employment in India, relative to those of men). 
 109. Id. at 256. 
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particularly their violent or para-military wings. India has been 
plagued by such organizations, mostly Hindu nationalists, since 
before its independence in 1947. The Shiv Sena, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and others have been responsible for 
religious massacres, harassment of both minorities and religiously 
tolerant governments, and one of the founding wounds of Indian 
politics: the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi.110 While political 
movements are tightly controlled in China, nationalism stands 
alongside economic growth as a pillar of the present government’s 
legitimacy, and ultra-nationalist sentiment is known to be strong 
among many young Chinese.111 The role that ultra-nationalists 
would play in a Chinese political crisis cannot be more than 
speculation, but it could hardly be good for liberal democracy. 
In material terms, nationalist groups offer their members an 
opportunity for economic advancement chiefly through patronage 
and participation in organized crime, particularly extortion.112 This 
 
 110. For the role of Hindu nationalist parties—particularly the Shiv Sena—in Indian 
politics, see SIKATA BANERJEE, WARRIORS IN POLITICS: HINDU NATIONALISM, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE SHIV SENA IN INDIA (2000); ASHOK DHAWALE, THE SHIV SENA: SEMI-FASCISM IN 
ACTION (2000); JULIA M. ECKERT, THE CHARISMA OF DIRECT ACTION: POWER, POLITICS, 
AND THE SHIV SENA (2003). For a propagandist’s defense of the program of the RSS, see 
M.G. CHITKARA, RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH: NATIONAL UPSURGE (2004). The career 
of the Shiv Sena in Mumbai and the surrounding state of Maharashtra combines nationalist 
rhetoric, street-fighting ethnic self-assertion, social-service provision, and community-building. 
Young men, particularly those who face limited employment prospects in the migrant slums of 
Mumbai, make up the organizational core of the party and the bulk of its militants. Dhawale 
gives a characteristic left-wing inflection to this fact: “An extremely vital element in the [Shiv 
Sena] social strategy was its appeal to unemployed and lumpenized youth[.]” DHAWALE, 
supra, at 73. Banerjee offers a somewhat more subtle account, noting that Shiv Sena 
organizations provided three kinds of benefits to the young male members who were the 
primary targets of recruitment: economic opportunity (chiefly through patronage and 
extortion), concrete social networks, and an ideology of membership or belonging in an 
imagined, essentially Hindu Indian identity. See BANERJEE, supra, at 111–13. Membership in 
nationalist organizations addresses several of the needs described in the earlier sociological 
sketch of the characteristics of populations of unmarried men. See generally supra Part I.B.2. 
 111. See Geremie R. Barme, To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde 
Nationalists, 34 CHINA J. 209 (1995) (detailing the rise of a fashionable form of ultra-
nationalist sentiment among young Chinese). For a discussion of the dynamics of Chinese 
nationalism from a cultural and anthropological perspective, see CHINA INSIDE OUT: 
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM (Pal Nyiri & Joana 
Breidenbach eds., 2005). 
 112. See BANERJEE, supra note 110, at 112–23 (describing economic benefits as a major 
part of Sena recruitment efforts to those who otherwise lack prospects); DHAWALE, supra note 
110, at 64–74 (detailing the appeal of the Shiv Sena to economically marginal youth and the 
party’s general benefit from economic crisis).  
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appeals to young men who tend to fare poorly in the legitimate 
economy. In social terms, nationalist organizations provide 
community centers, shared activity, and an environment of solidarity 
in which those who are blocked from other modes of social 
integration, such as marriage and employment, can enjoy belonging 
and recognition in their otherwise unattached status.113 Ideologically, 
nationalism provides an abstract community—the nation—with 
which those otherwise socially displaced can identify emotionally; 
moreover, violent nationalism assigns these young men an honored 
role: warriors, the defenders of a nation in which, without nationalist 
ideology, they might lack any substantial place.114 In this respect, 
nationalism at once valorizes the violent terms of status in 
populations of unmarried men and proposes to integrate that group-
specific status into a position of honor within the national 
community. In an irony that is at once poignant and unsettling, 
nationalist ideology sometimes places special emphasis on the 
warrior’s role as a defender of the nation’s womanhood, particularly 
against the depredations of an internal alien, such as India’s Muslims. 
Men who lack erotic, emotional, and social ties with actual women 
 
 113. See BANERJEE, supra note 110, at 117–18. She also favorably discusses the work of 
other observers who argued that “the Sena offered young Maharashtrians a sense of 
exhilaration not derivable solely from monetary gains,” but rather dependent on a sense of 
community built around discipline and order inflected by a spirit of “national solidarity.” Id. at 
118 (quoting MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, ETHNICITY AND EQUALITY: THE SHIV SENA 
AND PREFERENTIAL POLICIES IN BOMBAY 114 (1979)). On these accounts, “‘the Sena men  
. . . saw themselves [as] . . . unaccommodated men making a claim on their land for the first 
time, and out of chaos evolving their own philosophy of community and self-help.’” Id. 
(quoting KATZENSTEIN, supra, at 97). 
 114. Banerjee writes, “Many young men were . . . attracted by the Sena’s advocacy of 
violence as political tool . . . . Speeches . . . emphasized aggression, framed by a Hindu 
identity, as a legitimate and necessary element of political action.” Id. at 112. On the role of 
warrior identity and masculinity in Hindu nationalist politics, she describes the debt of both 
the RSS and the Shiv Sena to celebrations of a “warrior” tradition in Indian history and 
nineteenth-century Hindu revivalism, and observes, “Notions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘Hinduism’ 
intertwined closely in the political identity implicit in the Shiv Sena’s message. ‘Masculinity’—
incorporating such attributes as decisiveness, aggression, muscular strength, and a fighting 
spirit to do battle—juxtaposed feminine values, labeled as weakness . . . nonviolence, 
compassion, and consensus building.” Id. at 132–33. In her excellent discussion of Sena 
ideology, Eckert reports, “Violent action is considered not only as honest but further as 
courageous and manly . . . . This insistence on the true man being defined by physical strength 
and physical, nearly unmediated, violence, exemplifies the theme of the ‘recuperation of 
masculinity’” as a major appeal of the Sena. ECKERT, supra note 110, at 136. 
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are thus invited to imagine themselves the protectors of the nation’s 
femininity.115 
In this Part I have outlined the potentially disruptive relationship 
between biopolitics and the broader politics of nation, public 
morality, and warfare. I have argued that both historical precedent 
and current trends suggest that population decline and skewed sex 
ratios can produce or strengthen nationalist and reactionary politics. 
In the next Part, I put these developments in a broader context: the 
development and transformation of Euro-American biopolitics over 
the last three centuries. 
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BIOPOLITICS 
In addressing conjoined demographic crises and political threats, 
the world is not writing on a blank slate. The effort to formulate a 
political response must contend with the morally troubling legacy of 
centuries of history. In this Part, I survey that history and its 
implications for contemporary biopolitics.116 
An opening word is in order on the relationship between 
biopolitics and the basic commitments of modern liberal and 
democratic politics. On the one hand, the basic normative 
commitment of modern politics is to secure the freedoms of persons: 
we assess states by how closely they adhere to these principles, 
recently to the point of authorizing intervention and overthrow 
where states are grossly illiberal and undemocratic. Yet on the other 
hand, there is no perfect autonomy in politics because we are also, 
inevitably, resources for the state. In order to enforce a relatively free 
 
 115. For a discussion of this dynamic in Sena ideology, see ECKERT, supra note 110, at 
140–47. 
 116. In contrast with the intercontinental focus of this article’s discussion of demographic 
trends, this treatment of the historical stages of biopolitics is rather centered on the political 
and legal cultures of the North Atlantic. It would not really be accurate to describe China or 
India as having gone through the same first- and second-generation experiences that I ascribe 
to Europe and, in a lesser degree, the United States. In this respect, the historical material 
describes the origins and trajectory of the normative lenses through which readers trained in 
the North Atlantic legal cultures, or that of the post-World War II international human rights 
period, are likely to understand the relationship between individual reproductive choices and 
state interests. My rationale for treating this relatively restricted history is that the problems 
that define third-generation biopolitics really are ones that we—all the world—are in together, 
and in which the relationship between social or state interests and substantive reproductive 
autonomy comes into the same kind of difficulty and paradox whatever the historical normative 
developments behind it. I am thus writing for my audience a regional history of “our” 
response to what is now, in its broad outlines, a global problem. 
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social order, even a state entirely free of totalitarian ambitions makes 
demands on the wealth, the conduct, and the bodies of its citizens. 
Concentrating here only on the last—the concern of biopolitics—
citizens show up for jury duty; they report for prison, or are taken 
there; and, when there is war, they show up to fight and die. Our 
role as resources for the state is inevitable because our autonomy 
depends on the survival and integrity of the state. 
Preserving autonomy, therefore, requires distinguishing between 
cases where personal autonomy and the health of the state are 
reconcilable and others where they come into conflict. It is necessary 
to avoid two kinds of mistakes: first, overestimating the necessary 
extent of state regulation and thus excusing gratuitous invasions of 
autonomy; and, second, underestimating the need for state 
regulation and remaining sanguine about uses of autonomy that can 
produce serious problems for the state. The challenge of third-
generation biopolitics—to reconcile the commitment to reproductive 
autonomy with recognition of its systemic political implications—is a 
new and important instance of this general problem. 
A caveat is in order here. This discussion of the history of 
biopolitics is egregiously incomplete. It concentrates on political and 
cultural developments in Europe and North America to the exclusion 
of developments in other regions under discussion in this article, 
notably India and China. My reason is neither that I believe those 
countries’ experience can be assimilated to that of the North Atlantic 
(quite the contrary) nor that I believe they lack comparably deep and 
vital engagement with these issues.117 Rather, I am motivated by two 
kinds of limitations. One is a limitation in my audience, which for 
this article is almost exclusively made up of American legal academics 
whose training is predominantly in North Atlantic traditions. The 
other, which disposes of the issue, is my own regrettable lack of 
training to summarize the history of biopolitics in non-Western 
traditions. 
The above-discussed French obsession with fertility as an 
expression of national vitality or decline—the fruit of the king’s just 
rule and a barometer of virtue and vice in the population—began as 
 
 117. For a recent, book-length demonstration of this point, see AMARTYA K. SEN, THE 
ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN: WRITINGS ON INDIAN HISTORY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY (2005) 
(arguing throughout that Indian thought richly engages a variety of political, theological, and 
cultural issues, often ethnocentrically imagined to be the exclusive product of Western 
intellectual history).  
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part of an old tradition of magical association between fertility and 
the health of the realm. By the decades following the French 
Revolution, however, that obsession had become a policy aim 
steering the regulatory apparatus of the early-modern state. This aim 
was premised on the main idea of the first 150 years of biopolitics, 
what I call the “First Generation” biopolitics: that citizens and 
subjects were in good part resources for the nation, and that, like any 
important resource, they merited appropriate regulation in the 
national interest. With the end of World War II and the rise of new 
attention to reproductive autonomy, this premise came into 
disrepute, replaced by the main idea of “Second Generation” 
biopolitics: reproductive decisions belong to individuals, and any 
legitimate interest of the state lies in public morality and the well-
being of persons, not the maintenance of a pool of material resources 
composed of living human bodies. Moreover, such state interests are 
set against the premise of individual reproductive autonomy. The 
problems of “Third Generation” biopolitics emerge against the 
backdrop of the repudiation of the First Generation and the rise of 
the Second Generation. 
A. Thomas Malthus and Demographic Pessimism 
First Generation biopolitics can surely claim Thomas Malthus 
among its founders. Malthus enjoys the rare distinction of having 
bequeathed his name to a view of the world, one premised on the 
application to human beings of a putative biological principle: “the 
constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the 
nourishment prepared for it.”118 He applied this principle to human 
beings in the form of a simple and grim cycle in demographics and 
economics. Whenever wages (or other income) rose high enough to 
support fertility above the replacement rate, human beings 
responded with offspring.119 A rising population meant a larger 
workforce, which drove down wages to the point of privation, even 
starvation.120 “The poor,” Malthus wrote, “consequently must live 
 
 118. THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 14 (Donald 
Winch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1803). 
 119. See id. at 25–26. Malthus wrote of this principle: “The passion between the sexes 
has appeared in every age to be so nearly the same that it may always be considered, in 
algebraic language, as a given quantity.” Id. at 40. 
 120. See id. at 25–26. 
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much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress.”121 
The distressed poor would be unable to afford to marry or bring 
their children alive through infancy, which would induce a fall in 
population.122 This in turn would drive wages high enough to 
support reproduction at or above the replacement rate, beginning 
the grim cycle again.123 
I devote several pages to Malthus’s views for two reasons. First, 
he is seminal in the development of North Atlantic biopolitics, 
having inaugurated an alliance between would-be scientific social 
inquiry and the already familiar and recurrent anxiety about the 
demographic health of the nation. Second, the connection between 
Malthus’s intense conservatism and his biopolitical commitments is a 
stark reminder that biopolitics is political in quite a familiar sense: 
interpretations of demographic trends interact with and are often 
inflected by the fears, aspirations, and convictions of those who make 
them. It is partly with the reactionary legacy of Malthus in mind that 
I have undertaken this article, in the face of a new set of 
demographic crises, with an explicit commitment to securing and 
expanding substantive versions of liberal and democratic freedoms. 
Although he is now remembered in intellectual shorthand as a 
pessimist who failed to appreciate that rising productivity would 
enable a finite world to feed many more people than it once could, 
Malthus was very much a practitioner of demographic politics.124 The 
son of a radical minister who had embraced the French Revolution as 
an emblem of the promise of human improvement, Malthus turned 
sharply against his father’s political optimism.125 His theory is very 
 
 121. Id. at 25. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 25–26. 
 124. It is worth noting that although Malthus seems to have envisioned a steady-state 
economy and is, thus, routinely criticized for failing to anticipate that productivity increases 
would enable a finite world to feed a growing number of people, his thesis does not depend on 
the steady-state premise. On the contrary, the thesis that population will always increase in 
excess of the resources available to support it can apply at any level of productivity increase that 
does not outstrip the maximum potential rate of reproduction. Such a view, for instance, seems 
partly to have underlain Marx’s contention that the development of capitalism would lead to 
the steady impoverishment of the proletariat. For a discussion of the connection between 
Malthus and Marx in this respect, see David Singh Grewal, The Demographic Contradiction of 
Capitalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 125. See Donald Winch, Introduction to MALTHUS, supra note 118, at vii (describing 
Malthus’s father as “an ardent follower of Rousseau” and likely “attracted by [William] 
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much about the limits of politics; he argued relentlessly that 
unyielding tendencies in human nature constrained the power of 
political reform to improve human circumstances.126 
Malthus did concede that human reproduction differs from that 
of other species because people make self-conscious decisions in 
accord with plans of life.127 He referred to “preventive checks” on 
population as unique to humans, while “positive checks,” forming 
the cycle of overreach and privation sketched above, held for all 
forms of life.128 He classified the uniquely human preventive checks 
into “moral restraint,” meaning celibacy or at least continence, and 
“vice,” which included all “irregular gratifications” of the sexual 
desire, all of which he regarded as degrading to human dignity and 
especially to female character.129 He does not seem to have regarded 
regulation of “vice” as an appropriate goal of public policy. He 
treated moral restraint as a product of gradual increases in individual 
virtue, expressing doubt that even education in his demographic 
principles would persuade the poor to limit their reproduction.130 
Malthus’s polemical targets were visionary reformers. The thrust 
of his argument was that neither wealth redistribution nor other 
reforms in the economic or political order could improve the human 
lot because, by inducing the poor to reproduce faster, they would 
only intensify the cycle of expansion and privation. Malthus thus 
devoted a great deal of his Essay to deriding the programs of socialist 
reformers—including Marquis de Condorcet and Robert Godwin—
and to attacking England’s laws for support of the poor.131 The more 
ambitious the reform, the greater the burst in fertility and the 
 
Godwin’s anarchistic vision of a perfect egalitarian society without government or social 
hierarchy”).  
 126. See id. at ix (“Malthus embarked on a life-long attempt to show that those who 
attributed human suffering to defective social and political institutions overlooked one of its 
perennial sources and were guilty of fundamental error.”). 
 127. See MALTHUS, supra note 118, at 21–22. 
 128. Id. at 21. 
 129. Id. at 22–23. 
 130. Malthus suggested that “mere knowledge of these truths” might “not operate 
sufficiently to induce any marked change in the prudential habits of the poor.” Id. at 330. He 
did, however, insist that his thesis did not deny the possibility of progress but only restricted its 
possible sources: “To the laws of property and marriage, and to the apparently narrow principle 
of self-love, which prompts each individual to exert himself in bettering his condition, we are 
indebted for . . . everything that distinguishes the civilized from the savage state.” Id. at 331. 
 131. See id. at 45–123. 
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immiseration that would follow.132 Moreover, under conditions of 
want, an egalitarian allocation of property would give way to 
resurgent proletarianism as hungry laborers succumbed to hard 
bargains. Soon enough, the division between workers and owners 
would be restored, however visionary the plan of reform that had 
sought to replace it.133 Thus Malthus drew from his demographic 
principles a lesson of political quietism: 
That the principal and most permanent cause of poverty has little 
or no relation to forms of government, or the unequal division of 
property; and that, as the rich do not in reality possess the power of 
finding employment and maintenance for the poor, the poor 
cannot, in the nature of things, possess the right to demand them, 
are important truths flowing from the principle of population[.]134 
The purpose of his argument was thus “less . . . to propose new 
plans of improving society, than to inculcate the necessity of resting 
contented with that mode of improvement which is dictated by the 
course of nature,” that of incremental individual growth in the virtue 
of self-restraint.135 
B. The Vicissitudes of Human “Improvement” 
The marriage of demographic science and policy science that 
Malthus proposed became the core of first-generation biopolitics, 
although usually with more robust aims than Malthus’s, which were 
 
 132. Malthus’s treatment of Godwin’s egalitarian program takes this argument in its 
strongest form, imagining a society of perfect equality in which demographic crisis and 
reversion to inequality promptly follow as a result of demographic laws. See id. at 56–67. 
 133. See id. at 65–67. 
 134. Id. at 329. 
 135. Id. at 327. Again, Malthus was hardly a pure reactionary. He expressed hope that 
“the representative system,” by improving the standing of poor members of the community, 
would give them both something to hope for and something to lose, thus inducing a greater 
measure of prudence. Nonetheless, his constant theme was skepticism of reform. He wrote: 
But though the tendency of a free constitution and a good government to diminish 
poverty be certain; yet their effect in this way must necessarily be indirect and slow, 
and very different from the direct and immediate relief which the lower classes of 
people are too frequently in the habit of looking forward to as the consequence of a 
revolution. This habit of expecting too much, and the irritation occasioned by 
disappointment, continually give a wrong direction to their efforts in favour of 
liberty, and constantly tend to defeat the accomplishment of those gradual reforms 
in government, and that slow melioration of the condition of the lower classes of 
society, which are really obtainable. 
Id. at 253. 
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mainly proscriptive. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, the premises of biopolitics remained that (1) individual 
reproductive decisions had a substantial effect on the national 
interest and (2) policy decisions could legitimately take account of 
this interest in seeking to influence or dictate reproductive patterns. 
This stage of biopolitics carried an obsession with “improving” 
human stock that laid the groundwork for the poisonous eugenics 
movement of the twentieth century. As early as the opening decades 
of the nineteenth century, English reformers concerned with 
ameliorating the condition of the industrial working class joined 
Malthus’s belief that overpopulation caused poverty to a non-
Malthusian confidence that scientific progress could induce rapid 
improvements in well-being.136 These reformers broke with 
Malthus’s identification of birth control as “vice,” taking it instead as 
a critical instrument of progress.137 In the following decades, 
American utopians, such as those in New York’s Oneida community, 
attempted new modes of sexual regulation, including “male 
continence” (which depended on refraining from ejaculation, and 
would certainly have struck Malthus as “vice”) and “stirpiculture,” 
an Oneida eugenic practice aimed at improving the race by selective 
breeding and innovative childrearing.138 Like many utopian gestures 
in that period of American history, those practices only made explicit 
aspirations that were widespread in less articulate forms as Americans 
experimented with new modes of autonomy in a world of increasing 
choice. For instance, without any change in reproductive 
technologies, the fertility rate dropped by one child per white 
woman between 1830 and 1850, twice the decline of the previous 
thirty years.139 
Later in the century, biopolitics became linked to a statist 
utopian program that anticipated full-blown racialist eugenics. 
Operating without a well-founded genetic account of inheritance, 
reformers connected the qualities of children with the state of mind 
 
 136. See LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH 
CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 39–44 (2002) (distinguishing between Malthus’s pessimism 
and the reformism of some who took their cue from him). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 44–52. 
 139. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 163–64 (1984) 
(attributing these developments to a new interest in control over one’s own body as part a 
general flourishing of democratic attitudes and practices). 
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of the parents at conception, and, thus, argued for loosening or 
abolishing marriage laws to produce children born of love, not duty, 
who would accordingly display superior moral qualities.140 Other 
radicals of the post-Civil War period argued that increasing equality 
for women would “improve the race” along all dimensions, as 
women with power over their reproductive choices would (1) have 
fewer children to avoid the risk to health and life of childbearing, (2) 
choose fathers with an eye to the genetic patrimony of their children, 
and (3) conceive and bear children in a state of mind that would 
produce good qualities in offspring.141 
At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the 
twentieth, biopolitics turned toward the anti-immigrant and white-
supremacist eugenics that persists in infamy.142 Demographers 
warned that falling birth rates among native-born (and especially 
educated) white Americans, coupled with the high fertility of 
immigrant groups, could result in the complete replacement of the 
first population by the second.143 Sounding anti-feminist (as well as 
pro-natalist) themes from pre-Revolutionary France and even 
Augustan Rome, the enemies of “race suicide” assailed educated and 
wealthy women, whom statistics showed to be slow breeders, and 
warned that women’s participation in the workforce detracted from 
their roles as wives and mothers.144 President Theodore Roosevelt in 
1905 attacked women who avoided having children as “criminal 
against the race . . . the object of contemptuous abhorrence by 
healthy people.”145 Across the Atlantic, the same anti-feminist and 
anti-decadence themes sounded in the Germany of World War I, 
where the importance of healthy bodies as a national resource came 
to the fore in the long slaughter of trench warfare.146 Much the same 
 
 140. See GORDON, supra note 136, at 73–77. 
 141. See id. at 80–85. Although Gordon presents this species of optimism as quaint, I 
believe it has some value when stripped of pseudo-scientific pretensions. In fact, my argument 
in the latter portions of this article runs along the same lines. 
 142. See id. at 86–104. 
 143. See id. at 88 (discussing this warning, issued by demographer-sociologist Robert 
Hunter). 
 144. See id. at 86–89. 
 145. Id. at 86. (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE 
PAPERS (1910)). 
 146. See Elisabeth Domansky, The Transformation of State and Society in World War I 
Germany, in LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN: TWENTIETH-CENTURY POPULATION 
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response followed World War I in France, where in 1920 the 
Chamber of Deputies overwhelmingly passed an anti-contraceptive 
measure, an emblem of both the “almost universal support” for pro-
natalist values and “the new willingness of the French state to 
legislate on its behalf.”147 
However pernicious were the eugenicist programs that preceded 
World War II, the slide of scientific and pseudo-scientific 
demographic policy into genocide marks a horrific rupture in history 
and conscience which needs no rehearsal here. The aggressively pro-
natalist nationalism of Nazi policy was part and parcel of the 
eliminationist hatred toward “non-Germans” and “non-Aryans,” 
particularly Jews. As the West struggled to absorb the crimes of the 
world’s most literate and scientifically advanced country, talk of “race 
suicide,” of improving the national stock, and of the duty to produce 
for the nation all took on an aspect of the criminal, torrid fascist 
fantasy of ethnic sameness, of a nation without strangers. In 
retrospect, there was horror hidden (or not so hidden) in the 
pragmatic defenses of German sterilization policy in the American 
eugenicist, Eugenical News; the matter-of-fact transmission of 
German eugenicist claims about Jewish rates of inherited disorders in 
the Journal of American Medicine;148 and Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s pronouncement in Buck v. Bell that “[t]hree generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”149 After such knowledge, what forgiveness? 
There was little for the idea that the physical health of the national 
community, conceived in racial terms or in the imagery of fertility 
and virility, could be anything other than a marker along the way to 
totalitarianism. 
C. Second-Generation Biopolitics: The Turn to Autonomy 
The end of World War II ushered in a set of changes that moved 
biopolitics decisively away from the conception of persons as state 
 
MANAGEMENT IN A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 46–66 (Amir Weiner ed., 2003) [hereinafter 
LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN]. 
 147. Mary Louise Roberts, The Dead and the Unborn: French Pronatalism and the 
Abortion Law of 1920 , in LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN, supra note 146, at 91–92. 
 148. See EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S 
CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 297–301 (2003). I have avoided drawing on the 
arguments of this polemical book, but it contains considerable archival research on the 
eugenicist and other medical literature of the period shortly before the Holocaust. 
 149. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).  
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resources and instead made reproductive choice a basic dimension of 
a new conception of autonomy—one based in keeping the state out 
of decisions about intimate relations. One overwhelming negative 
motive drove this change: horror at what eugenic politics had 
wrought in Nazi Germany. The change also had several affirmative 
sources, which developed partly in response to eugenic 
totalitarianism and genocide. One was the rise of international 
human-rights culture, with its universalist commitment to securing 
individuals against state abuses.150 Another was the women’s 
movement, which brought trans-Atlantic and eventually global 
demands for women’s equal social, economic, and political 
participation, and whose leaders and members were almost uniformly 
committed to reproductive autonomy.151 A third, specific to the 
United States, was the turn of the Constitutional jurisprudence of 
personal autonomy from the Lochner-era concern with rights of 
property and contract in a free-labor economy to the post-New Deal 
emphasis on securing individual conscience and life-path, including 
choices about childbearing and intimate relations.152 A final and 
 
 150. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) (effective Sept. 3, 
1981) (committing signatories to provide “[a]ccess to specific educational information to help 
to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family 
planning”); id. at art. 12 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family 
planning.”). 
 151. See GORDON, supra note 136, at 242–78 (discussing the interaction of the women’s 
movement and abortion law and politics in the United States between the late 1930s and the 
late 1970s); Dorothy McBride Stetson, Introduction: Abortion, Women’s Movements, and 
Democratic Politics, in ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
STATE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE FEMINISM 1, 1–16 (Dorothy McBride Stetson ed., 
2001) (discussing the relationship between women’s movements and abortion law in Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, and 
Italy). 
 152. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 150–62 (1991) 
(describing Griswold and its progeny as interpretively transformed applications of the deep-
seated constitutional principle of protecting essential interests against state interference). For a 
flavor of the theories of autonomy that have sprung up around the jurisprudence of abortion, 
see Reva Siegel, Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 86, at 
63 (arguing that “criminal abortion statutes . . . coerce pregnant women to perform the work 
of motherhood” and cannot survive the principles of equal citizenship embodied in the 
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution), and Jed Rubenfeld, 
Concurring in the Judgment Except As to Doe, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, 
supra note 86, at 109 (denying that “the law [can] force women to bear children against their 
will” and finding in constitutional autonomy jurisprudence a repudiation of the long history in 
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critically important factor, which produced a massive increase in 
reproductive choice even where autonomy-based principles of sexual 
equality were weak or nearly absent, was the advent and diffusion of 
inexpensive and effective contraceptive technology, which greatly 
increased the degree of choice in conception even independent of 
legal abortion rights; similar developments in abortion technology 
increased the real capacity of women to control childbearing even 
where abortion remained illegal, and considerably increased the 
efficacy of the right to abortion where it was protected.153 
The implicit empirical supposition of the era of reproductive 
autonomy is that individual reproductive choices do not produce 
aggregate results in which the state has a legitimate interest sufficient 
to justify coercive reproductive policy. Justice Jackson’s famous 
observation that the Constitution is not a suicide pact154 implies an 
empirical judgment about the operation of fundamental rights: that 
in the vast majority of circumstances, individual autonomy will be 
compatible with the political governance, economic operation, 
military security, and intergenerational reproduction of the polity.155 
The prominence of reproductive autonomy in second-generation 
biopolitics, similarly, supposes that reproductive autonomy is not a 
demographic suicide pact.156 The two trends that this article has 
explored—population decline and sex disproportion—present a basic 
 
which “societies have found ways to keep women from deciding freely whether or when they 
will bear children”). 
 153. See Susheela Singh et al., Abortion: A Worldwide Overview, in THE 
SOCIOCULTURAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 15–49 
(Alaka Malwade Basu ed., 2003) (surveying incidence and safety levels of abortion worldwide). 
 154. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).  
 155. For a discussion of how changing facts may alter the balance among competing 
principles and pare back the domain of autonomy, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER 
EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004) (arguing that many features of 
everyday freedom suppose the good faith of others, which a prevalent terrorist threat 
undermines). 
 156. Neo-Malthusian arguments that population growth was out of control persisted 
throughout the period of second-generation biopolitics. Although those who were alarmed by 
population growth argued for a state interest in the aggregate results of reproductive decisions, 
their conclusions tended to support the agenda of reproductive autonomy inasmuch as they 
sought to promote family planning measures. Some, of course, crossed the line into support 
for China-style controls on family size, which set them athwart the spirit of second-generation 
biopolitics. For a sample of both aspects of this position, see EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 
17, at 202–19 (arguing that education and economic opportunity are the best long-term tools 
for reducing population growth, but also evincing considerable sympathy for China’s one-child 
policy). 
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challenge to the coherence and viability of second-generation 
biopolitics: the possibility that individual reproductive decisions can 
produce aggregate results with serious consequences for the well-
being of the entire polity. 
Having laid out the historical background to today’s biopolitics, 
I now turn to the first of two discussions of partial but promising 
solutions. In the next Part, I argue that novel financial arrangements 
can make possible intergenerational burden-sharing on the 
international level to make up some of the demographic asymmetries 
produced by declining fertility within countries while avoiding the 
political hazards of achieving the same benefits through immigration. 
This approach may provide some help in threading the needle I 
described earlier in Part III.B: the unhappy conjunction of two crises 
in the European and Japanese ideas of solidarity; the first, a financial 
crisis in the welfare state, and the second, a change in the ethnic 
homogeneity that social solidarity has long presupposed. 
Before starting this discussion, I should note that I do not 
admire ethnic homogeneity as a basis of national identity—quite the 
contrary. I propose a way to save parts of the European and Japanese 
models of social solidarity because the alternative may be worse, and 
because I believe solidarity is a value worth carrying forward into a 
more heterogeneous world. Changing everything at once brings risks 
better avoided. One of the major aims of public policy should be to 
affect the direction and sequence of sweeping changes to preserve 
the good that they endanger while taking advantage of the good 
potential that they bring. My proposal in the next Part is in that 
spirit. 
V. INTERGENERATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BURDEN-SHARING: 
A MODEL FOR BIOPOLITICAL PUBLIC POLICY 
An effective approach to the problems of today’s biopolitics 
requires engagement on several fronts: in the “core” biopolitics areas 
of reproduction and childrearing, and in the closely related fiscal and 
political crises that new demographic developments portend. While it 
would be stretching the concept of biopolitics too far to sweep in all 
public policy that responds to demographic crises, it is appropriate to 
count as biopolitics any policy that has two features. First, it is 
intended as a response to the problems generated by reproduction, 
childbearing, and other core issues in the governance of the human 
body. Second, in its design, biopolitical public policy acknowledges 
PURDY.PP2.DOC 10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM 
889] The New Biopolitics 
 931 
and seeks to take advantage of realities such as declining fertility and 
skewed sex ratios, directly engaging those problems in an attempt to 
extract opportunities from them. In this Part, I describe an approach 
to transnational fiscal policy that provides a model for biopolitical 
public policy in general. This model describes an imagined contract 
for international and intergenerational burden-sharing. It begins in 
biopolitical reality: plummeting fertility rates in rich countries 
produce a world where certain countries have very high dependency 
ratios, while others, including much of Asia and Latin America, now 
have proportionately large working-age populations. Moreover, 
slow-growing and falling populations in rich countries and still fast-
growing populations in poorer countries intensify another major 
difference between regions of the world: some, such as Europe, are 
rich in capital and increasingly poor in labor, while others, such as 
India, are rich in labor power—that is, in human bodies—but still 
hungry for capital. 
A public policy for a new set of biopolitical problems should ask 
whether there is a way to take advantage of these international 
asymmetries to mitigate the fiscal effects of demographic change. As 
noted earlier, the traditional way to do this is for regions with high 
dependency ratios and capital-labor ratios to permit immigration to 
swell their adult workforce.157 Yet massively increased immigration is 
probably politically unviable in most European polities and 
xenophobic Japan. In both hemispheres, hostility toward foreigners 
and skepticism about the possibility of integrating newcomers 
politically and culturally have produced calls for new immigration 
restrictions, the opposite of what fiscal solvency would require.158 
While there have also been calls for opening international labor 
markets, they have come mostly from commentators on the far left 
and have had little traction among mainstream students of 
international relations, let alone politicians and voters.159 
 
 157. See supra discussion and notes in Part III.B. 
 158. See supra discussion and notes in Part III.B. For a discussion of Japanese 
xenophobia, see Norimitsu Onishi, Ugly Images of Asian Rivals Become Best Sellers in Japan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A1 (describing popularity of racist, xenophobic graphic novels); 
Norimitsu Onishi, Japanese Find a Forum To Vent Most Secret Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 
2004, at A1 (describing popularity of a xenophobic Japanese internet bulletin board). 
 159. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONI NEGRI, EMPIRE 396–400 (2000) (calling for 
open migration). For a discussion of paucity of attention to open labor markets even among 
those who strongly advocate open markets in capital and goods, see David Singh Grewal, Is 
Globalization Working?, 20.2 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 247–59 (2006) (reviewing MARTIN 
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A novel form of fiscal policy offers a chance to achieve some of 
the benefits of labor migration without absorbing its political cost. 
This is just the sort of innovative approach that a biopolitical public 
policy requires.160 The model, proposed by Yale economist Robert 
Shiller, rests on the new technological viability of complex contracts 
for the sharing of risk and benefit across large populations over 
time.161 Shiller proposes that the capacity to gather and analyze 
unprecedented amounts of data lays the technological groundwork 
for what he calls “macro-markets”: index funds that would make 
possible investment in entire economic sectors or even national 
economies. He envisions, for instance, an agreement between 
nations to share portions of their GDP to compensate for 
performance above or below a specified baseline of expectation, 
making possible some hedging against national-level economic 
 
WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2005) and JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2004)). 
 160. As I note, this proposal is not original to me, although I believe its application to 
this problem is original. I lack the training to defend it in full detail, either theoretical or 
institutional—i.e., I have neither an economics Ph.D. nor experience as a financial analyst or 
risk broker. Moreover, this proposal is a different sort of animal from the material on 
substantive freedom that I treat in the next Part and which makes up the bulk of my proposals 
to address the problems of third-generation biopolitics. My reasons for including this proposal 
nonetheless are that (1) it seems inevitable that a suite of policy responses will be necessary to 
mitigate the demographic and political problems I am tracing; every bit helps; (2) institutional 
experimentation may take flight on the wings of necessity, so that an idea that seemed far-
fetched under ordinary circumstances would seem worth a try under exigent ones; and (3) it is 
a familiar role of the law professor to engage in disciplinary arbitrage, advancing certain ideas 
not by refining their formulation but by proposing to apply them in previously unfamiliar 
domains where they have something to offer. 
 161. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2003). The general form of Shiller’s proposal concerns the implications of new data-gathering 
and information-management technologies for risk-pooling. See id. at 110–20. Pooling risk 
through private and social insurance is, of course, one of the great advances of modern 
economic life, enabling individuals to diffuse losses that would otherwise be financially 
devastating by replacing the risk of massive costs that one must bear alone with a probability-
discounted periodic or lump-sum payment in the form of an insurance premium. Notoriously, 
however, insurance is dogged by moral hazard: the tendency of individuals who can externalize 
the costs of their actions to behave in riskier ways than they otherwise would, whether by 
driving recklessly or—where the insurance is income support—by accepting unemployment 
and collecting checks. Shiller proposes that collection and aggregation of data for the entire 
sector or region of the economy in which the insured participates, rather than the individual’s 
employment status or income, can enable an insurer to differentiate between losses that reflect 
sectoral changes beyond the individual’s control and others that are merely local to the 
individual. In a scheme of income support based on such data, payments would be based not 
on individual income, but on whether the average income of sector participants had fallen 
below a specified baseline. 
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downturns.162 These would not be charitable arrangements, but self-
interested contracts aimed at blunting the edge of bad luck. One can 
imagine, for instance, the benefits to regional stability of a contract 
that would have given Argentina’s and Indonesia’s governments a 
share of China’s booming national income during the disastrous 
financial contractions those countries experienced at the turn of the 
millennium. One can imagine the appeal to all parties of entering 
into such an agreement ex ante, when none knew which would 
experience a short-term fiscal crisis and which a continuing 
expansion.163 
This concept could form the core of a biopolitical public policy. 
Labor migration—the solution Europe, Japan, and Korea are likely 
to resist for political and cultural reasons—is an individual response 
to differences in wage rates (adjusted for cost of living, availability of 
employment, and so forth) across nations. These rates, in turn, 
reflect the ratio of labor to capital in each economy, with high-capital 
countries paying more for relatively scarce labor and plentiful labor 
taking low wages in relatively low-capital countries.164 In a borderless 
world where the costs of migration were zero, populations of 
workers would rearrange themselves—as capital has already begun to 
do—until a single, global average wage emerged for each 
occupation.165 Liberalization of international labor markets would 
allow workers in low-wage countries to take advantage of high 
European wages with some dragging effect on European wage rates, 
but also with the more-than-offsetting benefit of increasing the 
population of workers paying into Germany’s social pension system. 
The question is whether a complex international financial 
arrangement might take advantage of the same differential without 
moving bodies across borders. Could it, that is, take advantage of 
 
 162. See id. at 175–85. 
 163. For information on the Indonesian financial crisis, see Steven Radelet & Jeffrey 
Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, in CURRENCY CRISIS 105 (Paul Krugman 
ed., 2000). For information on the growth of China, see Keith Bradsher, China Reports 
Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at C5 (reporting 
9.9% growth in Chinese GDP in 2005, a figure in line with the last fifteen years of growth). 
 164. This is, of course, a simplified picture, particularly in its neglect of the human capital 
dimension of labor, which significantly affects the marginal economic value and, thus, the wage 
rate of workers. 
 165. This account leaves out the determinants of variation in wages within a single labor 
market, such as compensation for geographically undesirable locations. The exposition is 
deliberately simplified, but not to the point of distortion. 
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biopolitical facts to address biopolitical problems without creating 
the crisis in domestic politics that this article has warned might result 
from European and North Asian demographic contraction?  
Here is the form such a contract might take. The governments of 
Germany, Japan, the European Union, or all of these commit for a 
period of two decades to subsidize public investments in education, 
public-health, and infrastructure in India and China. In return, the 
Indian and Chinese governments commit a share of their future 
GDPs, roughly from the decades of working life of the cohorts that 
benefit from the rich countries’ payments, to the governments of the 
investor countries. These payments will subsidize the public pension 
plans of the investor countries when their “missing” workers (those 
not born under a sub-replacement birthrate) would otherwise have 
been contributing payroll taxes to the national fisc. 
These contracts would take advantage of the same resource 
differentials that drive labor mobility. The developing countries are 
rich in population (particularly young population) relative to their 
supply of capital for health and education to raise the value of their 
rising cohorts. The rich countries, by contrast, are rich in capital but 
relatively poor in population, particularly the working population of 
the coming generation. Under the contract envisioned here, the rich 
countries’ capital would help prepare the next working generation in 
labor-rich and capital-poor countries for productive careers. In 
return, workers in the latter countries would effectively become 
payers into the public pension systems of the capital-rich countries, 
replacing a portion of their diminishing working-age populations. 
These expenditures would not be foreign aid, but rather in the 
nature of investments. The contracts would enable capital-rich, high-
wage countries and labor-rich, low-wage countries to take advantage 
of asymmetric levels of development without incurring the political 
costs of massive migration. Such a contract could be written as a risk-
sharing instrument at both ends so that the investor country’s 
contributions would be contingent on its GDP during the years of 
its payment, or could be based, like many investments, on fixed 
payments by the investor in return for a share of a designated pool of 
wealth or income later.166 The investment structure of the contract 
 
 166. Of course, the poor countries’ repayments might also be fixed, which would provide 
some assurance for rich-country pension plans but considerable disincentive to poor-country 
governments reluctant to shoulder the burden of carrying European or Japanese retirees, 
regardless of their financial capacity to do so. 
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would produce incentives, usually missing from foreign aid, for the 
investing countries to monitor and police performance in the 
expenditure of their investments. 
Would returns from the investment be meaningful? Consider the 
returns from an index fund in the Chinese or Indian economy 
nowadays, when those two are doubling every seven and ten years, 
respectively.167 The contract proposed here would be a way for a 
country, or its pension system in particular, to make an investment of 
this form. The terms of the contract, of course, would depend on the 
parties’ forecasts for the performance of the developing economies, 
but that is nothing unusual in an investment contract. 
The attractiveness of an investment in this form would also 
depend on how the investing companies construed their alternatives. 
Specifically, it would be reasonable to compare the costs and benefits 
of alternative approaches to the fiscal problems that come with 
fertility decline. Earlier sections of this article have laid out the high 
costs of doing nothing at all: a massive increase in the dependency 
ratio and a potentially crushing burden on public pension systems. 
This section opened with a discussion of the political costs of 
reducing the dependency ratio by increasing immigration levels: a 
rise in nativist sentiment and backlash against liberalized 
immigration. As I note below, what may be the most attractive 
solution—pro-natalist policies aimed at reconciling family and 
work—comes at a high fiscal cost and seems, from the experience of 
France and the Nordic countries, to cushion but not avert the effects 
of fertility decline. Therefore, absent some new strategy, reciprocal 
international investment would seem a fiscally attractive and 
politically viable way to approach the problem. Naturally, there is no 
reason that adopting one solution would exclude simultaneously 
pursuing another. The aim would be an optimal mix of strategies, 
measured both in present cost and in risk-discounted levels of 
expected benefit. At a minimum, the contract envisioned here would 
be a strong candidate for a place in that mix. 
Would countries receiving payments in the early stages of the 
contract pay their obligations later? There is no easy way to repossess 
years of investment in health and education, and geriatric countries 
 
 167. As noted at supra note 163, China’s annual rate of growth has been around ten 
percent. India’s annual growth rate has been in the neighborhood of seven percent. See Saritha 
Rai, India: Growth, Still Strong, Slows, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at C4. 
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are not, other things equal, the most likely to go to war to collect 
their pension payments.168 These concerns are not empty, but 
countries have a remarkable record of faithfully repaying debt, even 
when the obligations date back to now-repudiated regimes or the 
payments make up unconscionable shares of public expenditure.169 
History provides as much reassurance as could reasonably be asked 
that governments would honor the debts envisaged in these 
hypothetical contracts. 
In this Part, I have argued that one partial solution to the 
problem of declining fertility lies in novel financial arrangements that 
can make possible intergenerational burden-sharing among nations. 
The solution does not concentrate directly on increasing fertility 
levels. Rather, it mitigates the effects of declining fertility levels in 
developed countries by taking advantage of international variation in 
dependency ratios across time. I have suggested that this partial 
solution is a model of biopolitical public policy, an approach to 
biopolitical problems that acknowledges and seeks novel ways to take 
advantage of the same biopolitical facts that produce those 
problems—in this case, internationally varying dependency ratios. In 
the next Part, I turn to a “core biopolitics” approach to both 
declining fertility and sex disproportion: promoting women’s 
substantive freedom in reproductive and childrearing decisions. 
VI. WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT, SEX RATIOS, AND FERTILITY:  
THE CORE OF BIOPOLITICS 
Both declining fertility and sex disproportion are intimately 
linked to the level of “substantive freedom” that women enjoy. By 
substantive freedom, I mean not just what women are formally 
permitted to do, but what they are in fact able to do.170 For instance, 
 
 168. Although superficially flip, the point that aging countries are relatively unlikely to 
project force in international relations is a serious contention of analysts concerned with 
fertility decline. See LONGMAN, supra note 26, at 20–21. 
 169. See SHILLER, supra note 161, at 180 (pointing out that such obligations are 
generally honored even in exigent circumstances). 
 170. This distinction tracks the “substantive” definition of reproductive autonomy that I 
gave for purposes of this article. See supra note 5. As there, I do not mean to make any point 
about the desirability or importance of a focus on formal freedom or nominal legal permission 
to act in a certain way. Rather, I am simply interested in a more inclusive metric of freedom, 
which I find captures many phenomena that motivate this paper. There is, of course, a serious 
problem in measuring substantive freedom as a “greater” or “lesser” quantum; a problem that 
generally plagues any effort to measure human well-being in an objective or “cardinal” rather 
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while the absence of a censorship law might constitute formal 
freedom to read about feminism or family planning, only literacy, 
combined with access to books, pamphlets, or online pages, would 
count as substantive freedom to read. Similarly, while women might 
be formally allowed to enter the labor market, unequal education, a 
husband’s threat to punish a wife for working, or the sexist attitudes 
of potential employers would all weigh against counting women as 
substantively free to work.171 Because these distinctions may seem 
fairly abstract and their content will vary from context to context, I 
will now break down the argument by way of particular cases. 
A. Women’s Empowerment and Demographics 
1. The contours of the problem 
The basic strategies for addressing sex dispropor-tion are to ban 
sex selection, to appeal to culture by raising the status of women, 
and to appeal to economic interest by decoupling family income and 
retirement security from the sex of children. The obvious ways of 
pursuing each strategy turn out to be unsatisfactory because they are 
relatively ineffectual.172 
 
than a subjective or “ordinal” sense; a problem, that is, for any attempt to judge aggregate 
human welfare or flourishing other than by revealed preferences. For information on the 
intellectual origins and continuing relevance of this problem, see Robert Cooter & Peter 
Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507 
(1984) (describing the rise of ordinalism as a Kuhnian paradigm shift that made some 
questions tractable by setting aside others, rather than a simple advance in methodological 
insight). I do not purport to solve that problem here, but rather to concentrate on the 
implications of substantive increases in freedom in particular domains: literacy, workforce 
participation, and, in consequence of these, participation in the decision making of the 
household. In these specific domains, if not in social aggregates at large, it is possible to say (1) 
what the object of inquiry is, i.e., what we are talking about, and (2) whether we are looking at 
more or less of it in a particular context. It may be that an attention to substantive, objective, 
or cardinal measures of well-being or capability requires this kind of move to the particular, but 
I leave that question to another time. 
 171. Sen has developed this position in many essays. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY 
AND FREEDOM 501, 583, 659 (2002) (including the sections Markets and Freedoms, 
Opportunities and Freedoms, and Freedom and the Evaluation of Opportunity); SEN, supra note 
66; AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT 509 (1997) (including the 
section Goods and People). 
 172. At this point, I suspect that morally motivated opponents of abortion will respond 
that I have tipped my ideological hand by ignoring the straightforward alternative of banning 
all or most abortions. It is my strong impression that, as a purely practical matter, the 
arguments advanced here about the ineffectiveness of bans of particular medical technologies 
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Begin with prohibition: banning (in order of increasing 
generality) sex-selective abortion, pre-natal sex-identification, or 
technology that enables that identification (regardless of its other 
uses). Of course, outright bans on technology such as ultrasound 
and amniocentesis bring their own costs in forgone medical capacity. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of prohibition is uncertain at best. Where 
the technology is available and parents want to use it, the procedures 
they seek seem to take place. Maharashtra, the state where Bombay 
lies, banned abortions that follow sex-determination tests in 1988.173 
The juvenile sex ratio there in 2001, however, stood at 109:100, 
more lopsided than in the majority of Indian states and more 
pronounced than in Maharashtra in 1991.174 The use of ultrasound 
technology for prenatal sex determination is illegal throughout 
China, which has not yet driven down the sex disproportion.175 
There is, then, reason to doubt that bans on use of medical 
procedures for sex-selection purposes are effective, at least under 
present cultural and administrative conditions. 
Changing economic incentives seems to make a difference, but at 
a high price. Experiments in China’s Zhejiang province suggest that 
instituting old-age pensions can indeed reduce the sex disproportion 
at birth.176 The main difficulty is that, thanks to the one-child policy, 
China’s fertility rate now stands at 1.70 children per woman, 
compared to 4.86 in 1970–75.177 The speed of that demographic 
contraction significantly outpaces even those of Europe and Japan, 
which thirty to forty years ago had much lower fertility rates than 
China’s. China’s dependency ratio will thus skyrocket in the coming 
decades, regardless of future trends in birthrates. Moreover, for all its 
extraordinary economic growth, China remains on the whole a poor 
country; one plagued by both administrative difficulty in tax 
collection and serious, long-term uncertainty as to its political 
 
apply a fortiori to bans on procedures that may be performed by a variety of technologies. 
Although a commitment to both formal and substantive reproductive autonomy is among the 
normative priors of this article, in this instance I think purely practical considerations are 
enough to settle the question. 
 173. See HUDSON & DEN BOER , supra note 4, at 111. 
 174. See id. at 105. 
 175. See id. at 246–47. 
 176. See id. at 245–46 (citing 6.3 Brides for Seven Brothers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998, 
at 58). 
 177. See WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra note 13, at 67. 
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stability.178 If rich countries face serious questions about sustaining 
public pensions through demographic contraction, the problem 
holds for China a fortiori. Besides the raw fiscal difficulty of making a 
Chinese pension program work, political uncertainty would reduce 
the effect of announced pension benefits on expectant parents. 
Discounting for the possibility of state failure or crisis leading to a 
change in the policy, many would still seek to have sons to insure 
against the disappearance of promised benefits. 
Raising the status of women is both attractive in concept and 
highly uncertain in practice. The power of state policies to induce 
cultural change of this sort is uncertain. China’s state education 
system is sex-neutral and has produced near-universal basic education 
for women but has not averted the present sex disproportion.179 Nor 
does economic development seem to address women’s status 
automatically by, for instance, promoting egalitarian ideas. In India, 
the sex ratios for affluent, educated families are often worse than for 
poorer families.180 Moreover, the low valuation of women feeds back 
into the shaping of economic reality: given lower priority than their 
brothers, pressed to marry, treated as subordinates by their 
husbands, and regarded as second-rate by employers, women will 
not in fact enjoy the same earning power as men, even when they 
attain the same level of education and are not formally barred from 
the workplace. 
Nonetheless, the feedback between economics and culture runs 
in both directions, and women who manage to make good on new 
economic alternatives may be able to demand better treatment in 
their personal lives and incrementally change their cultural status.181 
The problem is to find the right sequence of changes to set in 
 
 178. For a survey of these problems from a modestly polemical but informed perspective, 
see GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001). 
 179. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 252. 
 180. See id. 
 181. In the notes accompanying the next section, I cite a variety of authors—many 
particularly interested in South Asia—who develop this argument. Within the legal academy, 
my proposal to understand how distinct but intersecting spheres of activity interact in 
producing or inhibiting substantive freedom owes most to Madhavi Sunder. See Madhavi 
Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 561–62 (2001) (describing women’s 
empowerment as achieved partly through complementary capacities to dissent or resist 
coercion in both the public and the private spheres); Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 
YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (describing the same). 
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motion a cycle of increasing equality for women. I address that 
problem in the next section.182 
2. Women’s substantive freedom: The key to a cycle of reform 
As noted, sex ratios do not necessarily improve with general 
indicators of progress in well-being. Amartya Sen reports that 
“variables that relate to the general level of development and 
modernization either turn out to have no statistically significant 
effect, or suggest that modernization . . . can even strengthen, rather 
than weaken, the gender bias in child survival.”183 Such general 
indicators of development as urbanization, male literacy, the 
availability of medical facilities, and the level of poverty either fail to 
mitigate the sex disproportion or intensify it.184 Falling poverty rates, 
in particular, are sometimes associated with an increase in the sex 
disproportion.185 
None of this is particularly counter-intuitive, given a family 
preference for sons over daughters. Wealth and medical resources 
increase power over reproduction. Male literacy means access to 
information about medical procedures, urbanization means 
proximity to sophisticated medical technology, the prevalence of 
 
 182. For China, at least, lifting the one-child policy would seem a straightforward way to 
reduce the effect of preference for sons on the sex ratio of newborns. The limits of this 
measure, however, are evident in the results of an inadvertent natural experiment: Taiwan, 
which does not restrict the childbearing decisions of its citizens, has a male-female sex ratio of 
104.3:100. See HUDSON & DEN BOER, supra note 4, at 62. While significantly better than the 
figure for mainland China, this number suggests that cultural valuation of sons and their 
superior earning power exercise independent influence on sex selection. Taiwan has a mixed 
public-private pension system, with mandatory contributions to private schemes, but 
considerable problems with compliance and little allowance for movement from firm to firm or 
sector to sector by workers in the private economy. Although new reforms promise a more 
effective system with fewer gaps, one cannot say that Taiwan avoids the Chinese economic 
incentive to have male children as a form of retirement insurance. Taiwan is thus at best a 
partial control, relative to China, for isolating the influence of the cultural preference for sons 
on sex-selective abortion. See Shean-Bii Chiu, Taiwan: Compulsory Occupational Pensions Still 
Dominate, Int’l Conference on Pensions in Asia 6–7 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished paper, on file 
with author) (discussing gaps and inequities in Taiwan’s pension system); President Chen Shui-
bian, President Chen’s National Day Address (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.gio. 
gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/20051010/2005101001.html (discussing pension reform).  
 183. SEN, supra note 66, at 197. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. These figures refer to the sex ratio in the overall population and in the 
population surviving early childhood. I say more later about the implications for the sex ratio 
at birth. 
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medical facilities speaks for itself, and growing wealth brings the 
capacity to pay for procedures such as pre-natal sex-determination 
and abortion. Generally speaking, greater resources will mean greater 
capacity to bring about family desires, and millions of family-level 
decisions will register as systemic demographic effects.186 
What is interesting is to disaggregate the family, asking whether 
the preference for sons is common to all members or enforced by 
husbands, and, if the latter, under what conditions women might 
enforce a contrary preference. On this point, there is provocative 
evidence regarding sex disparities in early-childhood survival. While 
general indicators of development do not mitigate this disparity, two 
other variables do reduce sex inequality in children’s survival: 
women’s literacy and women’s labor force participation.187 These are 
indicators of development, but they are also, specifically, indicators 
of the level at which women have participated in the benefits of 
development. These data suggest that as women gain practical 
capacity, they enforce a relatively sex-equitable use of family 
resources, with great benefits for the survival of female children. 
In making sense of this phenomenon, it is helpful to follow Sen 
in treating families as sites of “cooperative conflict.”188 In this model, 
partly congruent and partly conflicting individual interests (including 
values and beliefs, which may of course include commitment to the 
family itself as a unit distinct from the sum of its parts) yield a 
“solution” for the family’s use of resources. The solution includes 
both a set of priorities and a set of decision-making procedures for 
setting or balancing priorities.189 A solution may be either relatively 
egalitarian or relatively inegalitarian, both in its acknowledgement of 
the preferences of different family members and in the role it gives 
 
 186. See ALAKA MALDWADE BASU, CULTURE, THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR, ILLUSTRATED WITH THE CASE OF INDIA 227 (1992) (arguing 
that the reason sex ratios in childhood survival sometimes worsen with increases in income is 
the corresponding increase in access to relatively high-quality medicine, which families with 
strong son preference will generally reserve for boys).  
 187. See id. at 160–81 (surveying and interpreting findings to this effect from India and 
elsewhere, including Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa). 
 188. See id. at 221. For a particularly helpful discussion and elaboration of Sen’s model, 
see BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE’S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA 
53–81 (1994).  
 189. See AGARWAL, supra note 188. 
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each family member in setting priorities.190 Applying this model to 
the issue of childhood survival suggests that, while a generic increase 
in the resources available to the family does little to make the 
solution more sex-egalitarian, an increase in women’s capacities 
enables them to enforce egalitarian solutions. How far literacy and 
access to work increase the standing, self-confidence, or other factors 
of “voice” within the family, and, alternatively, how far they change 
negotiating positions by creating an “exit” option into an alternative 
life is unclear, but some combination of effects is intuitive.191 What 
seems clear, however, is that when they can, women tend to enforce 
a use of family resources that supports the survival of girls as well as 
boys. 
It does not follow from this that women’s empowerment also 
diminishes sex-selective abortion. That would depend foremost on 
why women insist on sex-equitable solutions within the family: for 
 
 190. See id. As Agarwal points out, the variables that figure here are not just control of 
resources, but also cultural ideas of which issues are at stake in negotiation and which are so 
clearly settled as to be off-limits to bargaining. See id. at 73–75. Another important variable is 
which conditions women perceive as “problems” (whether or not open to negotiation) bearing 
on their well-being, or that of their children, and which are accepted (preceding even the 
question of negotiability) as untroubling. Sen and Nussbaum have emphasized the importance 
of an idea of false consciousness in this connection, suggesting that experience of 
empowerment reveals interests previously obscured from the interest-holder. See SEN, 
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 171, at 65, 90–92; Martha Nussbaum, Charles 
Taylor: Explanation and Practical Reason, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 232–41 (Martha 
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). Others have argued that the poor are always in some 
measure aware of their disadvantage and simply require practical opportunities, not enhanced 
insight, to challenge it. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS 
OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985). Although I tend to follow Sen and Nussbaum in believing 
that exposure to new experiences and ideas can revise one’s estimation of one’s interests—and 
that to believe the contrary would be more condescending than even a crude “false 
consciousness” view—the present argument does not require a judgment on this point. 
Increased capacity, or substantive freedom, is open to interpretation as either a source of 
insight into one’s interests or an instrument for pursuing and enforcing interests already 
recognized. For reasons to believe that self-understanding frames any negotiating process, see 
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 34–37 
(1985) (arguing for the place of self-understanding in constituting activity such as politics or 
negotiation). 
 191. The reference, of course, is to ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). For his 
part, Sen notes “considerable evidence that when women can and do earn income outside the 
household, this tends to enhance the relative position of women in the distributions within the 
household.” SEN, supra note 66, at 194. He also suggests that literacy and education make 
women aware of alternatives and give them some confidence in insisting on the legitimacy of 
their desires. Id. at 198–99. The phenomenology of these suggestions is of mixed voice and 
exit, which seems right. 
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reasons of sex egalitarianism or out of love for existing children. 
Mitigation of sex disparities in childhood survival rates might reflect 
indiscriminate love for children already born, meaning mothers 
would stick up for their living daughters but not refuse sex-selective 
abortions. Alternatively, sex-neutral maternal concern might extend 
to potential children. As a third possibility, empowered mothers 
might be resisting the valuation of male over female lives in general. 
If either the second or third alternative explained a significant share 
of the improvement of girls’ survival rates where women are 
empowered, then women’s increased capacities should also translate 
into successful resistance to sex-selective abortion, and thus to 
improved sex ratios at birth. 
Moreover, it would be artificial to imagine that the motives 
women bring to bear on reproductive decisions are constant, 
changing only as women’s capacity to effect their aims waxes and 
wanes. In fact, economic power and cultural status are intuitively 
connected here. An increase in women’s capacity will bring new 
experiences that, in turn, all but ensure new priorities for both 
women and men.192 Where women work outside the home and can 
read, the result is a different set of everyday interactions, 
expectations, and experiences of capacity, all redounding to women’s 
sense of agency in general and to the goals and priorities they set.193 
 
 192. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing Sen, Nussbaum, and Taylor 
on this issue). This is a kind of moral-psychological corollary of the growing recognition that 
women’s agency is a critical factor in economic and social development; not merely in the 
passive sense that it makes women bearers of greater quanta of well-being, but in the active 
sense that women’s empowerment contributes to development processes that affect both 
women and men. This thesis is the thrust of the discussion in SEN, supra note 66, at 189–203. 
For a recent summation of arguments and data supporting this view, see Isobel Coleman, The 
Payoff from Women’s Rights, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2004, at 80, 83 (“Educated women 
have fewer children; provide better nutrition, health, and education to their families; 
experience significantly lower child mortality; and generate more income than women with 
little or no schooling. Investing to educate them thus creates a virtuous cycle for their 
community.”).  
 193. See AGARWAL, supra note 188, at 421–66 (describing in several case-studies, as well 
as theoretically, how struggles over resources are also “struggles over meanings,” that is, over 
what women’s and men’s interests are and how they should count). “Struggles” should be 
underscored: women’s increasing control of resources has often resulted in both violence and a 
recrudescence of male-supremacist politics. See id. at 271–76 (describing such reactions). The 
view that changes in economic structure and opportunity and changes in individual values go 
hand in hand appears to find confirmation also in the decline in native-born white American 
fertility rates around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which prompted pro-natalist 
warnings of “race suicide.” Summarizing historians’ views of that period, Linda Gordon 
concludes, “The economic reorganization that made smaller families more economical also 
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3. Fertility and women’s substantive freedom 
In this sub-part, I return from sex ratios to the other half of my 
biopolitical discussion: the analytically distinct and geographically 
separate problem of sub-replacement fertility. Thus, we are once 
again primarily discussing the reproductive decisions of women and 
families in the richest developed regions. The common thread of the 
argument is that increases in women’s substantive freedom in each 
context should be a powerful element in any strategy to address the 
biopolitical crisis of that setting, whether it is missing women or 
missing heirs. Of course, the particular elements of substantive 
freedom at issue will differ from place to place. 
In wealthy, broadly liberal settings such as Europe (and to a 
lesser degree Japan and South Korea), the basic substantive freedoms 
that count so much for women’s well-being in poor countries are 
secure. The relevant question is not whether women are 
substantively free (i.e., are in fact able) to enter the workforce and to 
influence family decisions about resources and reproduction. The 
relevant question instead involves the structure of the tradeoffs 
women and families confront in making the decisions that shape a 
personal life and a career: whether to enter a reproductive 
partnership, whether to have a first child, whether to have a second 
or third child, whether to enter and remain in a career, whether to 
leave the workforce. While there may be neither formal nor 
significant practical barriers to a woman’s making any one of the 
decisions just listed, the opportunity cost of each may be such that 
certain combinations of choices are effectively impossible. If rich and 
poor alike are free to sleep under the bridges of Paris, so, too, are 
women free to leap those bridges in a single bound, with a child on 
one hip and a briefcase on the other. How many women will be able 
to do so is another question. 
It is, moreover, a question that public policy can influence. As 
noted, Philip Longman has argued that the cost to a middle-class 
American family of raising a child through age seventeen is about 
one million dollars, the lion’s share in forgone wages by one 
parent.194 Longman’s contention is that American families would 
 
made upper- and middle-class women eager for broader horizons, which in turn made them 
desire smaller families.” GORDON, supra note 136, at 100–01. 
 194. See LONGMAN, supra note 26, at 72–75 (summarizing his argument and cost 
estimates).  
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prefer to have more children than they in fact do, but they are 
deterred by the cost of childrearing.195 Thirty-eight percent of 
French parents report that three children is the ideal number for a 
family, but fewer than 15 percent have that number.196 As noted, 
German poll results suggest a preference for family size below the 
replacement rate,197 but this preference may in part reflect 
recognition of the costs of childrearing.198 These figures suggest that 
public policy increases the substantive freedom of women and 
families when it reduces the opportunity costs of bearing and rearing 
children in terms of workplace participation, and vice-versa.199 An 
increase in substantive freedom along these dimensions, all things 
equal, will mean increasing the number of children families have by 
reducing the marginal cost of each. Put differently, the goal would 
be reconciliation of two kinds of choices: the choice to bear children 
and the choice to work. Reconciliation has been the goal of French 
family-support policy since 1994, and it has come along with an 
increase in the country’s fertility rate in recent years, after three 
decades of decline.200 Moreover, France’s fertility rate has passed 1.9, 
making it the highest in the European Union (tied with Ireland) and 
significantly higher than those just below it, Luxembourg (1.78) and 
Finland (1.73).201 The country’s fertility rate is high despite the fact 
that France has one of the EU’s highest rates of two-earner families, 
with 70 percent of those including two full-time workers.202 Eighty-
one percent of women with one child and 69 percent of women with 
two children are in the workforce.203 These figures suggest that 
France’s goal of reconciliation has found some success. 
 
 195. See id. at 81–85 (reporting that United States women and families express a wish for 
more children than they in fact have). 
 196. See Hugh Schofield, Joy for France As Population Goes Boum, SUNDAY HERALD, 
Sept. 25, 2005, available at http://www.sundayherald.com/print51878. 
 197. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 199. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Marie-Thérèse Letablier, Fertility and Family Policies in France, 1 J. 
POPULATION & SOC. SECURITY 245 (2003), available at http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-
ad/WebJournal.files/population/2003_6/9.Letablier.pdf. 
 201. See id. The most recent report is of a rate approaching 1.92. See Schofield, supra 
note 196. 
 202. See Letablier, supra note 200, at 256. 
 203. See id. at 255. 
PURDY.PP2.DOC 10/12/2006 1:11:14 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
946 
Several kinds of transfers, targeted subsidies, and state-provided 
services work to reduce the cost of French children to their parents. 
Direct per-child payments (beginning once a family has two 
children) set a baseline, with both payments and tax breaks rising 
further for families with three or more children.204 Paid maternity 
and paternity leave policies rise to a three-year income entitlement 
for mothers (and occasionally fathers) of a third child who opt to 
leave work for that period.205 Most significant for the goal of 
reconciliation is an extensive scheme of child care, including state-
financed nurseries for children under three, schools beginning at age 
three, and tax-breaks and subsidies for in-home child-care.206 The 
effect is to reduce a panoply of childrearing costs: the danger of 
losing one’s job, the direct cost of care, and the income loss from 
forgone employment. The ultimate goal is to soften the often stark 
choice between bearing and raising children and remaining 
employed. 
It is instructive to contrast the French experience with those of 
other European countries. Indeed, Europe presents a laboratory of 
experimentation with fertility policy. Spain, which since the end of 
Franco’s fascist regime has pursued a passive policy that relies on 
families to make reproductive decisions and to care for their own 
children, has gone from having Europe’s second-highest fertility rate 
in 1971 to one of its lowest today.207 Germany provides relatively 
generous welfare-state support, but, until recently, it has offered little 
in the way of subsidized care for the pre-school children of working 
mothers, and it gives significantly shorter maternity leaves (at 
fourteen weeks) than France.208 The country’s overall family-support 
policy, while it consumes 2.7 percent of GDP, consists of 
pocketbook transfers that create no meaningful infrastructure to 
 
 204. See id. at 246–50; Schofield, supra note 196. 
 205. See Letablier, supra note 200, at 250; Schofield, supra note 196. 
 206. See Letablier, supra note 200, at 250–57; Schofield, supra note 196.  
 207. See GRANT, supra note 9, at 137. As with all such comparisons in Europe, there are 
confounding variables. Spain has experienced persistent unemployment among young people, 
which has probably interacted with a relatively new sexual libertarianism to delay childbearing 
or to inhibit it for reasons partly independent of state policy. See also Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, 
supra note 6, at 47 (noting the timing of Spain’s adoption of post-traditional values); David C. 
Unger, An Immigration Experiment Worth Watching in Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 
A12 (noting a persistent Spanish unemployment rate around ten percent). 
 208. See GRANT, supra note 9, at 95 (noting additionally that only five percent of pre-
school children of working mothers received subsidized child care).  
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reduce the burdens of child care and directly reconcile work and 
family.209 German fertility rates remain much lower than France’s, as 
the high opportunity cost of childbearing presses the average age of 
mothers at first birth to nearly 30.210 
The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden and Norway, 
follow a family-support policy much nearer France’s, emphasizing 
reconciliation of work and family. They enjoy commensurately 
higher fertility rates. Norway guarantees forty-two weeks of paid 
maternity leave, about three-fifths as much paid paternity leave, and 
an option of either tacking on a year’s unpaid leave or accepting 
substantial, income-scaled subsidies for child care.211 Sweden 
provides 390 days of paid leave, which parents can divide as they 
wish (except for sixty days set aside for the secondary care-giver, a 
gesture toward gender equity).212 Public childcare, which in 
Scandinavia has always aimed at reconciling work and family on 
ground of gender equity, enables about two-thirds of Swedish 
mothers with young children to work outside the home.213 A 
remarkable feature of Swedish demography is that fertility is “pro-
cyclical,” that is, positively related to women’s earnings and 
employment levels, suggesting that Sweden’s policies of 
reconciliation have substantially reduced the tradeoff between 
women’s equal economic participation and childbearing.214 
That such policies are costly hardly needs remarking. Crudely 
put, they are subsidies for the production of a valuable resource: 
replacements for the present generation of workers and taxpayers. 
 
 209. See Europe: Kinder, Gentler; Germany’s Declining Population,  
ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2003, at 39 (describing child-care facilities as “poor or non-existent” in 
the West German welfare state and noting that childrearing “has traditionally been considered 
a private not a public matter” in Germany).  
 210. See id. 
 211. Marit Ronsen, Fertility and Public Policy – Evidence from Norway and Finland, 10 
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH art. 6, 146–47 (2004). Ronsen’s longitudinal study of Norway and 
Finland did not find expansion of public child care correlated with an increase in fertility, but, 
as Ronsen noted, this unexpected and counter-intuitive finding likely reflects the fact that child 
care emerged at a time of increasing female participation in the workforce, and thus interacted 
with a growing commitment to work and increased opportunity costs in child-bearing. Id. at 
160. The relevant question is the difficult counter-factual of what would have happened had 
women entered the workforce in large numbers without the benefit of public child care—
specifically, whether fertility might have fallen to something nearer German levels. 
 212. See GRANT, supra note 9, at 124. 
 213. See id. at 125. 
 214. See id. at 130. 
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Regarded as a subsidy they are open to plausible justification: parents 
absorb much of the cost—and all the employment-based opportunity 
cost—of their children, while reaping only a tiny and diffuse share of 
their children’s later contribution to the economy.215 The massive 
positive externalities of children are sufficient economic reason to 
encourage their production. 
A complementary rationale is the increase in women’s substantive 
freedom which reconciliation policies produce. This freedom is 
valuable, not just because it induces higher fertility rates, but also as 
a social goal in itself. In developing countries, increases in 
substantive freedom press fertility rates downward as women exercise 
newfound agency to resist pro-natal norms that have long been 
enforced by direct coercion or lack of meaningful alternatives.216 In 
wealthy countries, however, the effect may be the opposite: with 
expanded sets of viable choices, women and families are particularly 
interested in reconciling several kinds of goods, such as career and 
childrearing. There, an increase in substantive freedom will mean an 
increase in fertility rates over present levels, which partly reflects the 
costly tradeoffs of choosing to have children. A society of greater 
substantive freedom to reconcile such complementary goals is a freer 
society. 
As noted earlier, such policies may not increase fertility to the 
replacement rate in many rich societies. Estimates of the elasticity of 
parents’ decision to bear children even in France suggest as much—
although one must bear in mind that such indifference curves are 
artifacts of personality and culture, not natural kinds.217 
Replacement-level fertility, however, need not be the standard of 
success. Policies that can mitigate the effects of fertility decline while 
increasing substantive freedom are desirable in both respects, even if 
they cannot carry the whole weight of the task. 
 
 215. See LONGMAN, supra note 26 (discussing Philip Longman’s analysis of the cost, 
including opportunity cost, of raising a child). 
 216. For a discussion of the remarkable effect on fertility rates of the indicia of women’s 
substantive freedom, particularly labor market participation and literacy, see SEN, supra note 
66, at 198–99. 
 217. Researchers estimate the elasticity level of demand for children in France to be 0.2, 
suggesting that fiscally viable subsidies can press fertility upward, but not to replacement level. 
See Guy Laroque & Bernard Calanie, Does Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives?, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/apmicro/am05/salanie-051215.pdf. 
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B. Women’s Empowerment and Democracy: A First Pass 
The falling fertility rates of rich countries and the rising sex 
disproportion of poor countries both conjure up alarming political 
associations. In Europe, particularly, perceptions of demographic 
decline are historically associated with reactionary and authoritarian 
politics. In India and China, as elsewhere, large populations of 
unmarried young men are ideal recruitment targets for ultra-
nationalists and other extremist movements. In the last Part, I 
argued that increases in women’s substantive freedoms can mitigate 
the two demographic crises, and thus also diminish their 
consequences. Here, I present tantalizing evidence that women’s 
substantive freedoms may also have a direct effect on politics, 
tending to make extremism and authoritarianism less potent. If this 
is true, then women’s empowerment is an apt response to the 
demographic crises on both the level of demography and the level of 
politics. 
One of the most provocative forays into this issue is by political 
scientist M. Steven Fish.218 Fish was drawn to the question of why 
predominantly Islamic countries are less democratic than others, 
even correcting for levels of economic development (widely 
acknowledged to correspond to democratic governance).219 
Dissatisfied with the claim that Islam is culturally hostile to 
democracy in some ill-specified way, Fish introduced a new 
independent variable: the subordination of women, as measured by 
women’s literacy, sex ratios in the living population, and the 
percentage of high government posts occupied by women.220 
The preceding discussion suggests that the first two are 
particularly apt indicators, as literacy affects women’s substantive 
freedom in family and social life and sex ratios express women’s 
agency or lack of it. Taking as a dependent variable the numerical 
assessment of democratic governance assigned each country in the 
world by the nongovernmental organization Freedom House, Fish 
found that each of his indicators of women’s subordination 
significantly reduced the explanatory power of a country’s 
 
 218. See M. Steven Fish, Islam and Authoritarianism, 55 WORLD POL. 4 (2002). 
 219. See id. at 13–14 (stating that the link between Islam and authoritarianism “is too 
stark and robust to ignore, neglect, or dismiss”). 
 220. Id. at 24–28. 
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predominantly Islamic or non-Islamic population makeup.221 Fish 
offered several provisional theoretical speculations about the causal 
story behind these findings. Perhaps male domination in family and 
social life sows authoritarian habits of arbitrary power in some, 
craven subordination in others, and diminishes the expectation that 
power in general should be answerable to either egalitarian principles 
or demands for reason-giving.222 Perhaps the integration of women 
into a variety of social, economic, and political contexts induces 
different, less authoritarian behavior in the men of those contexts.223 
Perhaps, for whatever reasons, women tend to hold attitudes less 
conducive to authoritarianism than men, such as weaker tastes for 
domination and hierarchy or a preference for cooperative or 
consensual problem-solving.224 
 
 221. See id. at 25–29. (“Women’s status . . . on the whole . . . appears to account for part 
of the link between Islam and authoritarianism.”). 
 222. See id. at 30–31. This view finds support from some commentators within the 
Muslim world. See ABDELLAH HAMMOUDI, MASTER AND DISCIPLE: THE CULTURAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF MOROCCAN AUTHORITARIANISM 44–143 (1997) (arguing for a causal 
connection between patterns of interpersonal domination and submission and political 
authoritarianism); HISHAM SHARABI, NEOPATRIARCHY: A THEORY OF DISTORTED CHANGE 
IN ARAB SOCIETY 26–60 (1988) (arguing in a similar vein). 
 223. See Fish, supra note 218, at 30–31. This model would depend on the social-
psychological effects of negotiation and bargaining. For a discussion of recent research in the 
social psychology of reciprocity, with particular attention to its relevance to legal questions, see 
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
71 (2003). Brain researchers have also found that areas of the brain associated with emotions 
and social engagement are activated in individuals who show high levels of trust and 
reciprocity, potentially suggesting that training in reciprocal negotiation induces motivation to 
further reciprocity. See James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 
NEURON 395, 395–405 (2002); Kevin McCabe et al., A Functional Imaging Study of 
Cooperation in Two-Person Reciprocal Exchange, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11832, 11832–
35 (2001). I discuss the historical development of the moral psychology of reciprocity as an 
idea in political economy and law in Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to 
Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1253–58 (2005).  
 224. See Fish, supra note 218, at 30–31. This view is associated with “difference 
feminism,” the position that women tend to a distinct and characteristic set of values and 
attitudes that are salutary in social and political life. For a classic statement of this view, see 
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and Morality, 47 HARV. 
EDUC. REV. 481 (1977) (criticizing Lawrence Kohlberg’s account of moral learning, with its 
emphasis on application of abstract principle, as insufficiently relational and contextual, and 
identifying women’s perspectives with the latter qualities). For a psychoanalytically informed 
version of a similar perspective, see NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF 
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 173–219 (1978) (arguing 
for a relationship between deeply embedded gender characteristics reproduced through parent-
child relations and the social and institutional structure of liberal capitalism). 
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This is not the place to attempt an assessment of these 
competing but potentially complementary explanations. For my part, 
I am intensely skeptical of arguments that suppose any “essential” 
social or political attitudes inherent in men or women, and reflexively 
friendly toward arguments that emphasize the variation in potential 
attitudes within both sexes, depending on institutional and cultural 
context.225 My own discussions in this Part reflect that emphasis, 
treating women as agents and bearers of interests inflected by 
revisable self-conceptions, rather than as vectors of essentially 
“feminine” values or social modes. 
I will offer one view of how women’s empowerment may weaken 
the power of extremist politics. Today, the ideological appeal of such 
nationalism almost always involves a reaction to women’s increased 
social participation and power within the family, and a proposal to 
restore “traditional” relations. This attitude holds for the Shiv Sena 
and other Hindu nationalists,226 Islamists,227 and smaller-scale 
reactionary movements that revive such customs as belief in, and 
persecution of, witches as a way of constraining empowered 
 
 225. This emphasis partly reflects an interest throughout my work in how attitudes 
toward politics, sex, race, human equality or inequality, and so forth vary from time to time 
and place to place, and how institutional change can induce changes in attitudes, or at least 
clear space in which such changes can occur. I think any awareness of the variety of human 
experience of sex and gender makes confident generalization in an essentialist vein almost 
impossible to sustain. My emphasis on contingent aspects of sex and gender also reflects a 
political choice: so long as we cannot know what is fixed and what is mutable, an interest in 
how non-coercive institutions can open space for free exploration of mutability—particularly in 
newly egalitarian sex relations—seems to me an appropriately experimental and open-ended 
attitude. 
 226. For a discussion of this dynamic in Sena ideology, see ECKERT, supra note 110, at 
142–43 (reporting that Sena members frequently identify themselves as defenders of the honor 
of their nation’s women and defenders against the alleged threats to purity of ethnic mixing). 
For information on the topic of Hindu nationalism as the assertion of a masculine principle, see 
Brian K. Smith, Re-envisioning Hinduism and Evaluating the Hindutva Movement, 26 
RELIGION 119, 120–23 (1996). 
 227. For discussion on the persistent appearance of women’s status and free activity as a 
spur to Islamist affiliation, see generally Blind Faith, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 27, 
2005, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/blind-faith/2005/08/26/1124563028951. 
html (substantiating through reportage on the political and theological affiliations of the July 
7, 2005 London bombers and their “jihadist obsession with purity amidst the perceived 
corruption of the West”). Many commentators have remarked on the same quality in the 
Islamist abhorrence of the West. See, e.g., Jonathan Raban, My Holy War, NEW YORKER, Feb. 
4, 2002, at 28 (noting the gynophobia and “sense of extreme moral precariousness” in 
connection with women of the founding Islamist Sayyid Qutb). 
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women.228 To the extent that women have become invested in both 
their new capabilities and an expanded view of their interests and 
potential agency, they might well experience contemporary 
nationalist movements as a direct threat. This interpretation avoids 
essentialist speculation about women’s intrinsic attitudes toward 
hierarchy or the effect of feminine presence on institutional culture. 
Instead, this interpretation focuses on the concrete fact that most 
contemporary nationalism and related extremism present a threat to 
the status and participation that increase women’s power to control 
resources, exercise power within the family, and influence 
reproductive decisions. 
This interpretation is quite plausible in Europe and may help to 
explain why declining fertility has not produced a meaningful 
upsurge in support for nationalist agendas there. It is not that there 
has been no effort to yoke such agendas to concern about falling 
population. On the contrary, France’s far-right National Front has 
linked demographic alarms to attacks on abortion rights and calls for 
restoring women’s traditional roles as mothers and housewives.229 
This classic expression of reactionary pro-natalism, however, has 
found little traction in contemporary France, where women’s 
integration into political and economic life has shifted even 
mainstream pro-natalist positions from a first-generation emphasis on 
children as social resources to solicitude for women’s autonomy that 
falls much nearer the spirit of the second-generation commitment to 
autonomy. As Marie-Thérèse Letablier notes, twentieth-century 
French family policy rested originally on “the idea that children were 
a collective investment,” and thus “[m]others of numerous children 
were rewarded for being ‘good citizens’ by giving children to the 
Nation.”230 
In recent decades, however, this sex-specific idea of citizenship, 
in which women’s civic role is substantially identical with their 
biological function, has given way to a relatively gender-equitable 
concern for women’s capacity to reconcile family and work 
 
 228. See AGARWAL, supra note 188, at 271–76 (describing such episodes in Indian 
villages as responses to women’s increased control of resources). 
 229. For discussion on the intersection of the National Front’s anti-immigration stance 
and its concern with the decline in “authentically French” births, see Carolyn Sargent, 
Counseling Contraception for Malian Immigrants in Paris: Global, State, and Personal Politics, 
HUM. ORG., July 1, 2005, at 147. 
 230. Letablier, supra note 200, at 246. 
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commitments.231 This reconciliation-oriented approach is compa-
tible with recognizing that there is a collective interest in the 
aggregate results of individual reproductive decisions; in this respect, 
it comes to grips with contemporary demographic problems. The 
reconciliation-oriented approach, however, is not compatible with 
the historical impulse of pro-natalist politics: coercion in 
reproductive decisions and insistence on a return to traditional sex 
and gender roles. It makes room to acknowledge the social interest 
in reproductive decisions but bounds that interest by principles of 
autonomy and gender equity. 
This analysis gives cause for guarded optimism. It suggests that 
some kinds of progress are hard to reverse—specifically, that once 
women are integrated into political and economic life on relatively 
equitable terms, their commitment to their own substantive 
freedoms will constrain the potential scope of reactionary politics.232 
In this respect, at least, history may not be prologue: past episodes of 
reactionary pro-natalism occurred in times and places where women 
were much more economically and politically vulnerable than in 
Europe today. Conversely, if political commitments to women’s 
substantive freedoms are fairly stable, this means that acknowledging 
demographic concerns in politics and policy may not be as 
worrisome as it has sometimes seemed in a period haunted by the 
ugly memory of first-generation biopolitics. 
This hopeful point, however, leaves open two major reasons for 
concern. One is that women’s gains in substantive freedom may 
remain quite vulnerable outside Europe—both in Japan and Korea—
where fertility is well below replacement rate, and in those countries 
where the demographic problem is sex disproportion. Because 
women’s substantive freedoms are both the best means to address 
the demographic problems themselves and, maybe, a check on the 
extremist politics that otherwise tend to accompany both 
 
 231. See id. at 256–60 (outlining this shift). 
 232. Of course, a commitment to a mutable and contingent idea of the political behavior 
of the sexes leaves open the possibility that empowered women will behave in ways that 
undermine what I am calling their substantive freedom—for instance, by supporting political 
programs that urge a return to hearth and kitchen or by opposing formal reproductive rights. I 
can only respond that, as a rule of thumb, those who stand to lose resources or alternatives 
from a political program are somewhat less likely to sign on than those who do not. I am 
essentialist enough about human rationality to accept this description as capturing a 
widespread tendency, albeit one that ideological, psychological, religious, or other appeals can 
sometimes overcome. 
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demographic crises, their fragility is worrisome. Second, even 
assuming that women’s substantive freedoms are good checks against 
reactionary pro-natalist politics, there is less reason to believe they 
would similarly check the nativist and racist politics that might 
accompany a large increase in the number of immigrants to Europe 
or East Asia. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whether freedom is sometimes self-undermining is an old 
question, but not a tired one. Asking it is an important way of 
ensuring that we do what is necessary to preserve essential freedoms. 
In this spirit, I have argued that reproductive autonomy can produce 
social and political consequences that might endanger liberal 
freedoms. The argument is not an attack on reproductive autonomy, 
but a reflection on what might be necessary to preserve it.233 In 
different cultural, economic, and political settings, increasing control 
over the number and the sex of children has produced sub-
replacement fertility rates and a growing sexual disproportion among 
children and young adults. Both trends contribute to potential 
political crises: a demographically inflected crisis of the welfare state 
on the one hand, and a potential for growth in authoritarian parties 
and institutions on the other. 
The most promising response is not to cut back on reproductive 
autonomy but to deepen and broaden it by seeking to increase the 
 
 233. Some readers, particularly Neil Siegel, have suggested that the appeal of this article’s 
argument might be entirely independent of the reader’s beliefs about the moral status of 
abortion: those who favor reproductive choice, as I do, should find in the paper an analysis of a 
potential threat to it and a response that is compatible with preserving it; while those who 
oppose reproductive choice should still be persuaded that sex-egalitarian social relations and 
reconciliation of childbearing and career are attractive ways to mitigate serious demographic 
crises. While this “overlapping consensus” view of the article is plausible and has some appeal 
to me, I prefer to leave it as a speculative matter rather than insist on who should agree with 
me and why. My motivations are to address potential threats to three values I hold dear: 
liberalism, democracy, and a vision of sexual equality that includes formal and substantive 
reproductive autonomy. Anyone who shares all or some of these values and is persuaded by my 
analysis might well join in my conclusions. I suspect, however, that readers who regard 
abortion as deeply wrong will find the entire discussion morally blind, and object to my 
combination of (1) supposing the normative attractiveness of all aspects of reproductive 
autonomy and (2) treating the results of abortion decisions in a consequentialist way rather 
than concentrating on the inherent moral status of the act. The argument will thus strike them 
as perverse or incomplete. To those readers I can only say that this is the character of deep and 
abiding moral disagreement, and that I hope my description and argument nonetheless have 
some force for them. 
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bases of women’s substantive freedom: in developing countries, 
education and workforce participation; in rich countries, the capacity 
of women and families to reconcile work and childrearing.234 
Although best paired with other policies, a focus on increasing 
substantive freedom belongs at the heart of a political response to 
both demographic crises. Promoting substantive freedom is not just 
normatively attractive from a liberal perspective: it is also the best 
practical solution to the paradoxes of autonomy. In this case, at least, 
the answer to freedom’s self-undermining potential is to become 
freer still. 
 
 234. This is a slightly rhetorical way of putting the matter. As I note particularly in the 
text accompanying note 170, supra, it may not be possible to produce a unified metric of 
“substantive autonomy.” In any event, that is not a task I have attempted here. A more 
analytically precise way of putting the matter is that substantive reproductive autonomy’s 
aggregate results are less likely to undermine liberal or democratic values to the extent that 
reproductive autonomy is complemented by substantive freedom in literacy, workforce 
participation, and the capacity to reconcile childbearing with career. Thus, enhancing these 
dimensions of substantive autonomy is likely to be an effective, as well as a normatively 
attractive response, to the problems of third-generation biopolitics. This autonomy-enhancing 
response should be taken as a progressive alternative to the attacks on reproductive autonomy, 
formal and substantive, that might accompany the illiberal dangers of third-generation 
biopolitics. 
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